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Reveal the Hero’s Heart
Anne Elise Crafton
What came about brought to nothing
The hopes of the one who had wrongly hidden
Riches under the rock face. First the dragon slew
That man among men, who in turn made fierce amends
And settled the feud. Famous for his deeds
A warrior may be, but it remains a mystery
Where his life will end, when he may no longer
Dwell in the mead-hall among his own.1
When asked to recall the image of a Dragon, many would envision only
the sort of animalistic, mute creature from such contemporary popu-
lar culture asGame of Thrones orHow to Train Your Dragon. Over cen-
turies of cultural retelling and globalization, the Dragon has become a
recurring image across myriad forms of media. However, today’s im-
age neglects the vast mythic history of Dragons that composes a pillar
of European cultural history. Mythic stories are the backbone of self-
identification and the symbols within such tales are extremely telling
of a culture’s priorities. Specifically, in northern Europe the melting
pot of mythic elements has been repeatedly stirred by authors desiring
to create stories inherently native to their people. Thus, tropes such as
enchanted woods, Dragons, or powerful rings, are easily identifiable
1 Seamus Heaney, Beowulf: ANewVerse Translation, 1st Bilingual Edition (New York,
NY: Farrar, Straus / Giroux, 2000), lines 3058–3065.
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as essential to the region. In order to understand the cultural history of
northern Europe, it is necessary to analyze not only the transformations
of literature but also of myth.
Perhaps the most well-known mythic element has been the old foe
of northern European heroes, the great and terrible Dragon. Quite
different from the voiceless beasts of contemporary stories, mythic
Dragons dwell deep in the realm of European consciousness. From the
Anglo-Saxon manuscript of Beowulf to J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit,
Dragons are found across time and continue to fascinate readers of all
ages.2 As a symbol now universally known for greed, deception, and
danger, the Dragon has been permanently embedded in European cul-
tural history and remains a popular trope among authors of fantasy
to this day. Their roles in mythic narratives have dramatically trans-
formed over the centuries in direct relationship to historical changes
in the real world in which they are imagined.
Scholars of northern European literature and culture have largely
ignored Dragons, either for their supposedly primitive reputation
or for their association with the modern fantasy genre. There have
been, however, many who have studied the dragon-slaying myths of
the Mediterranean and Near East.3 Calvert Watkins’ highly detailed
linguistic study on the Dragon in the Indo-European cultural sphere
comes the closest to an anthropological examination of the Dragon-
hero encounter. However, Watkins’ interests lie with the philological
ties between various myths rather than the philosophical. Even schol-
ars who discuss European fairy stories, such as Michael Drout or David
Harvey, relegate the Dragon to a single chapter or mention among
their voluminous works.4 However, the impact of the Dragon on the
northern European consciousness invites further study. To unpack
the secrets of the Dragon’s hoard would be to approach the European
cultural heart from a fresh perspective. To understand this relationship
2 J.R.R. Tolkien and Christopher Tolkien, Beowulf: A Translation and Commentary:
Together with Sellic Spell, trans. and comm. J.R.R. Tolkien and Christopher Tolkien
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); J.R.R. Tolkien,The Hobbit: Or,
There and Back Again (Crows Nest: George Allen & Unwin, 1937).
3 Calvert Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1996).
4 Michael C. Drout, Rings, Swords, andMonsters: Exploring Fantasy Literature (Audi-
ble: Modern Scholar, 2008); Singers and Tales: Oral Tradition and the Roots of Lit-
erature (Audible: Modern Scholar, 2014); David Harvey,The Song ofMiddle Earth:
J.R.R. Tolkien’s Themes, Symbols andMyths (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
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and assess the changes in the structure and meanings of myth in West-
ern culture, this study aims to contextualize key developments in the
portrayal of Dragons from the early medieval to the modern era and
analyze the development of northern European self-reflection within
the Dragon-hero encounter. Though Dragons are only one mythic
element among many, they provide insight into the crucial role that
such elements play in developing cultural character and inheritance.
Through examination of the different examples of northern Euro-
pean mythic art and literature, the Dragon becomes evident as a signifi-
cant trope. Each work reflects a step in the development of the Dragon’s
overarching character, and every author recycled and contributed to
the tropes found in the medley that is folk literature. A close analysis of
each work will reveal the process by which the Dragon has become so
central to fantastic fiction. The Beowulf manuscript provides the earli-
est written example of a northern Dragon, though the tale combines
centuries of oral tradition. This draconitas, a beast with human emo-
tions, gave future authors the bones with which to brew the soup of
Dragon tales, to use Tolkien’s metaphor from his article, “On Fairy Sto-
ries.”5 The Biblical influence of the medieval image of Dragons cannot
lightly be put aside, as images found in bestiaries and in saints’ lives,
such as that of St. Margaret, have a clear Satanic inspiration. This study
will therefore compare and examine the Dragon of the Book of Revela-
tion from the Bible with later characteristics imbued into the element
by medieval authors. Later contributions, such as Richard Wagner’s
Ring cycle, Tolkien’s extensive works, and John Gardner’sGrendelwill
also be thoroughly considered as continuations of the legendary genre.
These latter works purposefully sought to create a national or philo-
sophical heritage, which they accomplished through Faerie and heroic
encounters with the supernatural. Such a distinct choice reveals strong
cultural ties to not only the idealized northern European hero but to his
great reptilian foe as well. Through close readings of each iteration of
the Dragon, the overall pattern of development and specific character
shines through as bright as the Dragon’s extensive hoard. The Dragon’s
character is a contrast to the ideal European hero; the development of
the Dragon can thus be highly insightful for how northern Europeans
perceived their peak examples of heroism. The hero’s morality and
character becomes defined against the Dragon’s amoral ways, in which
5 J.R.R. Tolkien and Christopher Tolkien, The Monsters and the Critics, and Other
Essays (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1984).
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the protagonist’s quality is illuminated by the creature’s depravity. By
shining a light onto the transformation of Dragons, it will be possible
to see the European champion all the more clearly.
This study’s main terms of reference in secondary literature are
thus mythological studies, as they create a framework that reveals the
significance of such tropes to Europe’s essential narratives; works such
as Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough and Alan Dundes’ compilation
of essays, Sacred Narrative; Readings in the Theory ofMyth, are particu-
larly helpful with their definitions of mythic elements.6 Frazer’s exten-
sive work, though considered by some to be outdated (his reference to
rituals as “primitive,” for example), was one of the first to identify com-
mon cross-cultural themes in mythology. Tolkien’s academic research
on Beowulf and the nature of fairy stories is also foundational to the
cross-cultural scope of this research; Tolkien’s analysis in “On Fairy
Stories” provides a springboard to address the question of the ultimate
purposeandutility of mythicparadigms. Evenwithout his fictional con-
tributions to the genre, Tolkien’s academic work left an impressionable
mark on the field and revitalized literary research on both Beowulf and
mythic stories. These works, combined with primary source analysis,
will provide the historical backdrop for the study’s analysis.
If You Thought Myths were Insignificant, You were
Mythtaken
Defining myth has long been a source of contention among scholars.
In contemporary terms, the word often describes something as primi-
tively untrue or a mere superstition. As Lauri Honko notes, the term has
become heavy with emotional overtones that often imply an inherent
spuriousness in the stories it describes.7 However, when understood
as a multidimensional manifestation of cultural expression, myth can
be seen as transcending notions of truth and reality. Thus, its contribu-
tion to both global and local culture cannot be easily explained away
by the notion that myth is a falsehood believed only in the past. In his
6 James George Frazer, Robert Ackerman, and Robert Fraser,The Golden Bough: A
Study inMagic andReligion, Revised 2002 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002);AlanDun-
des, ed., Sacred Narrative, Readings in the Theory ofMyth (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984).
7 Lauri Honko, “The Problem of Defining Myth,” in idem, Sacred Narrative, 41.
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essay “The Problem of Defining Myth” Honko delineates several key
characteristics of mythological stories that lend themselves to a com-
prehensive definition. Primarily, myth can be described as a form of
symbolic expression, an integrating factor of man’s adaptation to life, a
charter of behavior, and a marker of social relevance.8 He also proposes
that the interaction between the audience and a story composed of for-
mulaic aspects can trigger cultural possession. In other words, stories
made up of repeated elements or type scenes can be familiar to an ex-
tent that the audience feels it can claim possession of that story, even if
it is only a new arrangement of old elements. Mythic stories can also
be understood as representations of the ideal so that those partaking
in reality may have a model. For example, it is assumed that the casual
listener may not have the opportunity to slay a Dragon of their own
but, in the case of confrontations with negative qualities or characters,
they ought to embody the likes of St. George or Siegfried. The hero of a
particular myth emulates the qualities that are valued within the ascrib-
ing culture and in their victory they conquer the threat against their
community’s survival. Myth can, therefore, be described as a form of
creative expression that has been elevated to demonstrate models of
behavior and institutions.
Mythic stories are a genre of literature that serve as building blocks
for a perceived shared culture. Myths can be multiform and currently
exist primarily in retellings or written representations of oral tradi-
tions. Thus, elements within myths can be reused to invoke inherently
native settings and themes. Mythic tradition can also be constitutive
in its amalgamation of social, religious, and political life. Drout sug-
gests that it is the epic tradition within this matrix that creates shared
culture.9 Mythological studies endeavor to find meaning within sym-
bols used repeatedly throughout a culture’s vast canon. According to
the Mythological Studies Journal, “Mythological Studies explores the
understanding of human experience revealed in mythology and in the
manifold links between myth and ritual, literature, art, culture, and
religious experience.”10 Harvey explains that mythological studies are
a search for the symbols that represent the most essential nature of the
8 ibid.
9 Drout, Singers and Tales.
10 Fujio Mandeville, “What is Mythological Studies?,”Mythological Studies Journal 5




human condition and that ”the myth collectors or the myth writers
were trying to preserve part of the culture or interpret the cultural tales
within the field of literature.”11 Mythic elements are intimately tied to
traditions and ancient oral associations so that a mere mention of the
element brings to mind previous incarnations of the trope.12
The human brain is especially proficient at identifying patterns
made by cultural repetition. In his lecture series, “Oral Tradition and
the Roots of Literature,” Drout describes how traditional stories are
not simply entertainment but a means of creating a shared conscious-
ness.13 The repetition of the multiform, or elements within, creates a
connection between the audience and the tradition itself, leading to a
communal identity.14 The mythic tradition allows individuals to use
elements for their own purposes, but ultimately the author anticipates
cultural awareness of the element’s mythic associations. Calling upon a
well-known element allows for an author to play with formulaic associ-
ations within the mythic tradition. For instance, in Homer, the phrase
“swift-footed Achilles” serves as a marker of all that the character em-
bodies and calls the audience to remember what Achilles has done to
achieve such a title.15 This is equally as effective in moments when
Achilles is marked as “swift-footed” but does not fulfill this epithet;
the audience recognizes that this moment is out of character and thus
it is made all the more dramatic. Likewise, when an author describes
a Dragon-hero encounter there are myriad expectations placed on the
type scene that any passive partaker in the northern European tradition
could recall. The author participates in the tradition by either reiterat-
ing long-standing expectations or reversing them in order to surprise
their readers. In contemporary vernacular literature, it is highly popu-
lar to take an image, such as the Dragon, long associated with negative
characteristics and adapt the narrative so that the element becomes the
protagonist. After the deconstruction of the mythic element and the
popularization of Dragons as features of a magical world, the image
has become reversed. Thus, a friendly Dragon, a philosophical Gren-
del, or a troll might find sympathy in a modern novel. This is seen in
the creation of children’s media such as Dragon Tales. Similarly, the
11 Harvey,The Song ofMiddle Earth, 15, 19.






Flight of the Conchords song, “Albi the Racist Dragon,” depicts an evil
Dragon who becomes friendly after an encounter with a previous vic-
tim.16 This too, however, depends on centuries of tradition so that the
new interpretation may reflect against the old.
Within mythological stories lie persistent elements that denote
their mythic setting. A cohesive definition of a mythic element is elu-
sive, as it seemingly overlaps with the fantastic and the childish. A sim-
plistic definition includes any element in a narrative that is mythical or
constructed, though this is far too broad to serve any practical purpose.
With such guidelines anything imagined, such as childhood fears or
lies, could be considered mythic, which borders on the absurd. Per-
haps a more specific interpretation is that a mythic element, like the
Dragon, is a distinguishing motif found throughout a culture’s literary
and artistic histories but not in its physical one. Likewise, a literary
trope can be defined as a figurative or metaphorical use of an image
or word. Though mythic elements are clearly a major part of any civi-
lization’s physical history, especially in terms of constructing national
ideologies and character, they are not truly of this world. A mythic ele-
ment may change in a few small details, but overall is reliably consistent
throughout a culture’s literature. Elements such as Dragons, objects of
power, magic, and Germanic deities are as identifying as a crest for the
North Sea cultural sphere. The Dragon is one of the most well-known
elements and presents an interesting quandary for the scholar: what is
so significant about a Dragon that gives it such a literary wealth?
Here beDragons
Dragons are ubiquitous in mythic literature, found in works from the
epic poetry of Beowulf , to various hagiographies, Wagner’s operas,
Tolkien’s mythologies, and to Gardner’s novel,Grendel.17 While there
is evidence of a gradual shift from beast to a distinct personality, the
16 Home Box Office, ed., Flight of the Conchords: The Complete Collection, (Compact
Disc) (Home Box Office Inc., 2010).
17 Mary Clayton and Hugh Magennis, eds., The Old English Lives of St. Margaret,
vol. 9 (Cambridge, Cambs.: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Masefield,
St. George and the Dragon (London: W. Heinemann, 1919); Richard Wagner,Der
Ring des Nibelungen (Bayreuth Festival, 2010 and Hong Kong, SAR: Naxos Digi-




Dragon’smodusoperandihas remained remarkably similar over the cen-
turies. Gardner’s postmodern Dragon is still recognizable as the same
type of character found in St. George’s passio. Dragons typically behave
as expected, fulfilling old stereotypes with minor tweaks that are passed
on to the next generation of storytellers. Just as a feast scene is part of
the formulaic expectations in mythic literature, so a Dragon confronta-
tion can be employed as a dramatic episode for the hero. Dragons stand
apart from the individual narrative, employed as a quality of the en-
counter with fate destined for the doomed hero. When the northern
European protagonist must grapple with his own destiny or experience
a sudden shift in his path, a Dragon is likely involved.
Remarkably, the hero and Dragon interact not just through phys-
ical, but verbal conflict as well. As they navigate conversations full of
threats, exposition, and deceptions, certain truths are revealed that
drastically alter the narrative. Whether a hidden history is revealed or
overarching philosophical motives discussed, these truths guarantee
that the even if the hero survives the encounter, they will never be the
same. Storytellers employ encounters with Dragons as the climactic
episode of confrontation with the hero, when he must accept his lot and
conquer an unwarranted force of destruction. Dragons have gradually
been chosen as a symbol of the underbelly of mankind, the manifes-
tation of the depravity of greed and lies. William Alfred has theorized
that the Dragon symbolizes chaos in that it prevents wealth from circu-
lating by guarding treasure in a hoard.18 Ultimately, Dragons serve as
a foil for humanity, a reflection against which the protagonist shines.
In the face of a beast consumed by wickedness, the hero either defeats
that which terrifies his community or dies tragically alongside his foe.
Regardless, fate finds its resolution.
This study focuses only on Dragons of northern European origin,
despite the rich history of Mediterranean, Asian, Near Eastern, and
Indic Dragons. The Mediterranean Dragon can be defined as a draco
or drakon, a beast that resembles the European Dragon but remains a
distinct creature.19 This draco remains a mindless creature in Mediter-
18 Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon, qtd 317.
19 For more information on the Dragons of the Mediterranean and Near East, see
LouisMoulinier and JosephFontenrose, “Python:AStudyofDelphicMythand Its
Origins,”Phoenix 15, no. 4 (1961): 242, doi:10.2307/108673 and theworks ofRussian
linguistsV.V. Ivanov andV.N.Toporov (VsevolodV. Ivanov,VladimirN.Toporov,
and Boris A. Uspenskij, eds.,Ketskij sbornik (Moscow: Nauka, 1968–)). Scholars
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ranean sources and lacks the distinct traits of a developing character.
Although the region employs this symbol in many of its myths and
literature, it is not a singularly defining element. Its form is largely
land based and occasionally poly-headed, as with the Hydra. On the
other hand, the Asian Dragon, such as the Chinese Luck Dragon, is
entirely separate from the northern European counterpart. As well as
being separated by countless miles, the two elements are employed in
nearly opposite instances. The Chinese Dragon is a symbol of luck, aus-
picious powers, and strength as well as control over torrential forms of
water. As bringers of rain, Dragons are regarded as symbols of abun-
dance and wealth. Their appearance is usually depicted as an immense
snake-like creature with four legs and miniscule wings. In China, to be
compared to a Dragon is a high compliment meant to refer to strength
and outstanding qualities.20 For instance, in WomanWarrior, Maxine
HongKingstondescribeshernarrator seeking the immenseandrevered
strength of Dragons rather than their destruction.21 Other Dragons,
such as Indic, Iranian, Meso- American, aboriginal, etc., have been stud-
ied at length by intrepid scholars and linguists. However, despite evi-
dence of linguistic ties between the Indo-European stories the overall
characteristics are quite distinct.22 As such, these Dragons are cultur-
ally apart from the northern European Dragon despite their modern in-
termingling. Other Dragons are certainly worthy of their own lengthy
examination. However, in order to discuss the ways in which northern
Europeans perceive themselves through their creations, this project
will focus solely on the elements from that region. For the purposes
of this study, primary sources will also be limited to mythic literature
rather than fantasy literature. Although modern fantasy, such as the
Young Adult Inheritance series, is heavily associated with mythic ele-
ments and Dragons, the genre often employs such elements for the sake
of appearing mythic despite being a limited Secondary World.
What sets a Dragon apart from a mindless, fire-breathing beast?
For future purposes, the character element will be defined as a
Emile Benveniste’sDictionary of Indo-European Concepts and Society (Chicago, IL:
HAU Books, 2016) and Louis Renou’sHistory of Vedic India (New Delhi: Sanjay
Prakashan: Sanjay Prakashan, 2004) have also done considerable work on the
Indic and Iranian Dragon encounter.
20 AMNH, “Asian Dragons,” March 23, 2018, accessed March 23, 2018, https://www.
amnh.org/exhibitions/mythic-creatures/dragons-creatures-of-power/asian-dragons/.
21 Maxine Hong Kingston,TheWomanWarrior (Ipswich, MS: Salem Pr, 2014).
22 For more information, see Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon.
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“Dragon,” while the animalistic figure will be denoted by “dragon.”
While a story may include dragons as creatures, it does not necessarily
feature a mythic element. For example, in J.K. Rowling’sHarry Potter
series, dragons are simply a feature of a magical world without voice
or higher intelligence. Modern fantasy stories often include dragons
to enforce the accepted list of fantastic elements, many of which
were established by Tolkien. A mythic Dragon is often an unchanging
character within the narrative, but a character nonetheless; its estab-
lished qualities will retain their defining traits reliably throughout the
work. Though the culturally accepted image of a Dragon has gradually
changed over the millennia, it rarely develops as a character within a
mythic tale. That being said, the modern image is an evolution of the
strict list of characteristics commonly known today. A typical Dragon
is expected to be greedy, proud, subtle, deceiving, nearly omniscient,
and often depicted in relation to a highly prized treasure. Watkins
believes that the Dragon’s propensity to guard treasure represents a
form of Chaos.23 In its fierce protection of the hoard, it keeps wealth
from circulating, “the ultimate evil in society in which gift-exchange
and the lavish bestowal of riches institutionalized precisely that cir-
culation.”24 Primarily however, a true mythic Dragon ought to be
capable of higher intelligence and human emotions if not comprehen-
sible speech. Additionally, the Dragon is generally not the consistent
antagonist throughout the work; it will rarely participate in a hero’s
odyssey anywhere apart from its own home, forcing the adventurer to
journey to it for the episodic confrontation. This can either be a critical
plot juncture or the hero’s final moment. Thus, the Dragon functions
as a definitive character among mythic narratives, both accessible and
reliable for European audiences.
Furthermore, an encounter with the Dragon is usually the climac-
tic episode of a narrative, the stunning confrontation after a series of
smaller adventures. Tolkien said in his famousMonsters and the Critics
lecture that “it is an enhancement and not a detraction … that [Be-
owulf’s] final foe should be not some Swedish prince, or treacherous
friend, but a dragon: a thing made by imagination for just such a pur-
pose.”25 Once the hero encounters the Dragon, the story experiences
23 For more information about the linguistic ties between Dragon myths within the
Indo-European Influence, see Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon, 300.
24 ibid.
25 Tolkien and Tolkien,TheMonsters and the Critics, and Other Essays, 128.
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a shift in tone and purpose. In fact, Dragon confrontations result in
revelations of difficult truths that always lead to the death of the hero.
Whether the truth is the hero’s inescapable mortality or hidden identi-
ties and motives, this truth is the catalyst of doom. Remarkably, while
the Dragon element is commonly associated with deception, it is also
the bearer of the truth of reality. In some Old Norse tales, the curse of a
ring-Dragon transfers directly to its slayer. According to Fontenrose,
Ivanov, and Toporov, the destruction of the Dragon represents a “sym-
bolic victory of growth over stagnations … and ultimately a victory of
rebirth over death.”26 Similarly, the hero destroys chaotic behaviors
and allows order to prevail within their community. It is by slaying the
Dragon that the hero symbolically destroys the blackest sides of hu-
manity and is able to come to grips with the nature of the world around
him.
Þætwæs yfel wyrm!27
Though the oral tradition of Dragons stretches far beyond any writ-
ten evidence, Beowulf exhibits one of the earliest northern examples of
such an iconic element. Although the original date of composition is a
source of contention among scholars, the oldest surviving manuscript
has been dated between c. 975–1025 CE. Beowulf remains the earliest
known written epic in a Germanic language and has been studied for
centuries for clues regarding culture, faith, oral tradition, and liter-
ature. In fact, its Christian author has presented problems for some
critics, who complain that he taints the pure pre-Christian tradition
with his religious commentary. However, the text’s very existence is
evidence of a slowly transitioning culture; a society with both Chris-
tian and pre-Christian influence that clearly values each tradition to
the extent of permanently recording them. Despite the early conver-
sion and official adoption of Christianity by the monarchy, the heroic
Germanic tales were clearly in heavy circulation. Tolkien states that,
“For [theBeowulf poet], Christianity had risen as a light over shadowed
places, and in that light he could reverence the stark bravery of Nordic
pagan idealism at its best.”28 Poetry such as “The Wanderer” or inser-
26 Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon, 299.
27 Old English: “That was an evil dragon!”
28 Tolkien and Tolkien,TheMonsters and the Critics, and Other Essays, 130.
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tions of Othere and Wulfstan into Boethius indicate a reluctance to
release a heroic pre-Christian past for a Christian future; however, the
post-conversion Anglo-Saxon literature seeks to justify their past by
inserting explicitly Christian references into ancient tales. Similarly,
Christian narratives were adapted with a distinctly Anglo-Saxon flair to
make them all the more palatable for their audience. For example, the
Beowulf manuscript also contains an adaptation of the deuterocanoni-
cal text of Judith. The story reads remarkably similar to Germanic war-
rior poems of pre-Christian days although it depicts the triumph of
the Hebrews over the Babylonians. In the same way, the Beowulf poet
looks back on the days of yore with a Christian framework and inserts
commentary within the narrative.
Beowulf is primarily an epic poem about the confrontation between
the might of heroism and the supernatural. The story opens with a de-
scription of the rise and slow decline of a Danish kingdom. The realm
is plagued by repeated attacks from a monstrous being, Grendel, but
the Danes can do nothing to hinder him. Beowulf comes to their aid
slays the monster. He eventually returns home to Geatland where he as-
cends to the throne. However, despite his peaceful reign, the kingdom
is attacked by a provoked Dragon who threatens to destroy all that has
been built. Reluctantly, Beowulf gathers a troop of his thanes and goes
to face the beast.29 His companions are revealed to be cowards when
they abandon their lord in his fight. All appears to be lost. Fortunately,
Wiglaf turns back and it is with his aid that the Dragon is slain. Regret-
tably, Beowulf dies of his wounds in the Dragon cave and is satisfied
in knowing that at least his kingdom will be safe and the hoard will
provide for his people. The poem ends with a lengthy eulogy in which
the people anticipate a future without the protection of their lord and
remember his strength.
Beowulf, the Geatish hero, must encounter a great beast that re-
sults in his downfall. Though this Dragon is not capable of speech, he
presents to the king the difficult truth of his mortality. Beforehand,
Beowulf seemed invincible; he easily defeats Grendel and expands his
kingdom as an undefeated monarch. The repeated moniker “He was a
good king” indicates a powerful, generous, and mighty lord. However,
the Dragon is his Achilles heel, as it were. The beast presents the tragedy
29 Thane: One who in Anglo-Saxon times held lands of the king or other superior by
military service; originally in the fuller designation cyninges Þegn, ‘king’s thane,
military servant or attendant.’Oxford English Dictionary.
12
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of an inescapable fate and is thus a test of heroic mettle. Unlike his pre-
vious trials, Beowulf is forced to rely on another to defeat the Dragon
and ultimately faces his death. The Dragon represents death and long-
awaited, or overdue, fate, in which he and Beowulf must equally par-
take. This can be seen in the Dragon’s repeated association with burial
and the dead; living in “the steep vaults of a stone-roofed barrow”
where he both “dominates the dark” and “guarded a hoard.”30 The
master, descended from the race whose treasure the Dragon guards,
had disturbed a past long dead in sending his servant to retrieve a part
of the hoard. In his desire to possess the treasure of his ancestors, the
master has awakened the doom of the kingdom and his lord. In fact,
Beowulf recognizes this before he even approaches the Dragon: “[Be-
owulf] well knew that linden boards would let him down and timber
burn. After many trials, he was destined to face the end of his days in
this mortal world; as was the dragon, for all his long leasehold on the
treasure.”31 Even as he looks upon the barrow, Beowulf is filled with
unfamiliar dread, “sensing his own death. His fate hovered near, un-
knowable but certain.”32 Here the Dragon is distinctly tied with the
doom of the hero and becomes the overdue confrontation with mor-
tality.
Though this Dragon lacks many of the wily characteristics found
in later versions, he clearly experiences human emotions such as rage,
fury, envy, and pride. The Dragon’s anger, awoken by the thieving ser-
vant, was a “rage … the people of that country would soon discover.”33
The poet describes the Dragon imagining the destruction of those who
would dare trespass his barrow and how he felt a “virulent hate” as
he destroyed the land.34 In fact, the Dragon’s traits are a mirror im-
age of Beowulf’s qualities that have led him to success. Where Beowulf
uses a berserker violence to defeat the enemies of mankind, the Dragon
has only a destructive force. Beowulf faces his fate with courage and
pride whereas the Dragon hides in his barrow to feel secure.35 When
Beowulf reluctantly ascends to the kingship after the death of his kin,
30 Heaney, Beowulf , lines 211–214. A barrow can be defined as a heap of earth over a
burial mound.
31 Tolkien and Tolkien, Beowulf , lines 239–244.
32 ibid., lines 2420–2421.
33 Heaney, Beowulf , lines 219–220.
34 Ibid, line 2319.
35 Ibid, lines 2322–2323.
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the Dragon greedily hoards simply for the sake of accumulating wealth
and power. For the Anglo-Saxons, an essential trait within a good lord
was liberal generosity; gift giving is a repeating motif found throughout
literature as a sign of the profound bond between thane and king. Be-
owulf is repeatedly cited as a generous lord. In fact, it is his generosity
that inspires Wiglaf’s adamant loyalty; Wiglaf’s family dwells on lands
given to them by Beowulf himself. The thane claims that he is willing to
die for his lord because he knows that Beowulf would do the very same
in return. Beowulf also has no intention to keep the Dragon treasure
for himself. Instead, his final moments are spent thanking God that the
treasure will go to his people. On the other hand, a lord, or figure of
power, who hoards their wealth and refuses to bequeath favor was seen
as both isolated and tyrannical. Just as Alfred suggests, the Dragon pre-
vents the circulation of wealth by merely sitting on wealth for the mere
sake of its shine.36 It exists as a foil against Beowulf’s true generosity.
Here the Dragon embodies this negative image of an avaricious lord
that is ultimately defeated by Beowulf.
The Dragon exists completely apart from Beowulf’s adventures and
flourishing kingdom and only enters that world when he is disturbed by
a thief. His existence does not merit explanation by the author for the
Dragon belongs to the same mythic realm as Beowulf. A feature of an
accepted magical reality, the character simply appears when disturbed.
In fact, it is not the mere presence of men but the theft of a miniscule
portion of his wealth that angers the Dragon. His only response is that
of violence and retribution against entire villages rather than the indi-
vidual at fault. John Hill writes that ”as with Grendel’s initial raid, the
enflamed arrival of the dragon-gaest, unanticipated, carries no tension -
only destruction and a darkening of mood.”37 The story suddenly turns
sour at the mention of a creature whose motivation is hoarding greed
and whose only action is violence. Thus, Beowulf must face the Dragon
as his final confrontation with cruel fortune. He is obligated to muster a
small band of brave thanes to make the journey to his doom. Ultimately,
everything that he had gained - his men, strength, and sword - abandon
him. The tragedy lies primarily in the unavoidable nature of his fate;
although Beowulf has accomplished superhuman feats in the past, he
cannot conquer the Dragon. It is his acknowledgement that the con-
36 Watkins,How to Kill a Dragon, qtd 317.
37 John M. Hill,TheNarrative Pulse of Beowulf: Arrivals andDepartures (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 2008), 75.
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frontation will be his last that inspires emotion in the audience. There
is no doubt that this is Beowulf’s key moment; the old hero confronts
fate and the evil of the world for the sake of mankind. Rather than living
on as a great king, Beowulf chose to epitomize heroism in his accep-
tance of responsibility and ultimate sacrifice. As Hill states, “Beowulf
is then the poem’s supreme guardian against, and the exterminator of,
terror.”38 The hero must fade with the Dragon so that mankind can
live up to his example while mourning his loss. Thus, this ancient text
indicates the beginnings of the long tradition of Dragons, and the en-
counter with such a character being the pinnacle of the hero’s career,
the chief deed for the greatest of heroes.
Beowulf is the hero of heroes, the greatest Geat to have walked the
Earth. When the anonymous Anglo-Saxon poet chose to record the
pre-Christian tale, he clearly deemed him a representation of the noble
past. The audience sympathizes with Beowulf most keenly despite the
myriad characters described by the author. He is miraculously strong,
an unbelievable swimmer, a noble wanderer, and the greatest king his
domain has ever seen. Seemingly without fault, Beowulf stands as the
pinnacle of human achievement. The Dragon, therefore, is his ultimate
foe.Despitehis earthly triumphs,Beowulf must inevitablygrapplewith
the reality of his own mortality embodied by the Dragon. The Dragon’s
wanton violence and possessive greed are the antithesis to a healthy
community. It is thus the king’s direct contrast of qualities that can de-
feat the evil. In his acceptance of the coming battle, Beowulf embodies
the heroic quality of self- sacrifice for a magnificent death. Mourned
and celebrated, the late king is eulogized as the ultimate example of
strength and might. Yet, if even this pinnacle of manhood must fade,
let him do so gloriously and in a final moment of triumph. The audience
can imitate Beowulf’s charge not only for death and glory, but for the
people they must protect.
Beowulf has so far succeeded on the back of his might and fairness
to his people; prosperity had been brought about by peace and generos-
ity. Þæt wæs god cyning (That was a good king)!39 Remarkably, the goal
is not to steal the Dragon’s hoard but to restore peace to the kingdom.
The destructive force of a raging Dragon and the symbols of greed and
fate must be confronted by the hero. However, the truth is revealed
38 ibid., 6.
39 Old English: “That was a good king.”
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in the course of the fight: Wyrd, or fate, is inescapable. His past tri-
umphs are nothing, his thanes desert him, and Beowulf is forced to
grapple with the inevitability of his own doom. He dies not the slayer
of a Dragon, but a participant in the great fight against anti-Saxon val-
ues. The Dragon and the hero lay as parallel corpses; the best man, the
mythical acme of humanity, has left Middangeard along with the rep-
resentation of evil so that weaker humans may rise to his example. A
typical Anglo-Saxon message, this reveals that although man may reach
his pinnacle in life, he cannot escape the same death that awaits all. The
hero has grown beyond his immediate community to represent all that
humanity could achieve but grapples with the same difficulties as the
rest. The poem ends unhappily with mourners bewailing the fate of
their ruler-less kingdom and imparts the reader with a melancholic but
emotional thrill.
Curious St. George
As Europe became the stronghold of Western Christianity, the Dragon
took on various religious attributes and became a repeating figure in ha-
giography.40 Just as early myths describe pre-Christian heroes to emu-
late, a saint’s life describes an ideal to which the Christian layperson as-
pires. A reader of Juliana’s passiomay never grasp a demon by its throat
as she did, but they can certainly use her vigorous example in their con-
frontations with quotidian temptations. As both entertainment and
religious commentary, hagiography allowed for a continued literary
tradition of Dragon-hero encounters. The natural association of the
reptilian Dragon with the tempting Serpent of the Garden of Eden tied
the character intimately with the Devil. Moreover, the Biblical book of
Revelation depicts Satan as a “great red Dragon” that is eventually de-
feated by the returning Christ.41 In this way, Christ’s actions reflect the
hero’s triumphant defeat of the violent threat against His people. Post-
conversion, Anglo-Saxon scribes often retold Biblical stories through
their own cultural lens. Similar to the Beowulf scribe’s adaptation of
a pagan past through a Christian perspective, poets might reimagine
Biblical or apocryphal stories within their cultural tradition. In the
impressive poetic adaptation of Genesis into Old English, the poet de-
40 The writing of the lives of saints.
41 Rev 12:3–9 NKJV
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scribes an encounter similar to the Dragon-hero conflict. A poem re-
markably written in the vernacular tongue instead of Latin, “Genesis”
indicates that even within the first centuries of conversion northern
European authors were connecting the characters of the Dragon and
the Devil. Similarly, although Jesus Christ is ultimately victorious over
the Satan-Dragon, it brings about a new world in which nothing is as it
was.
There is evidence of an early association with thewyrmand demonic
figures, as displayed in “Solomon and Saturn I.” This poem repeatedly
describes Satan as “the Dragon of hell” and the Word of God as the en-
emy of Dragons.42 Solomon asserts that “sometimes [demons] slither
like venomous serpents, stinging a fierce beast or biting field cattle, or
morph into mighty, death-dealing dragons.”43 In other Germanic cul-
tures, there was a strong association with Satan and Loki as serpentine,
draconic figures of mischief.44 Loki’s symbol, intertwining serpents,
was a direct parallel to the Serpent of the Garden of Eden. Such con-
nections were often drawn in the early days post-conversion in order
to enable an ease of transition. As hagiography, whether passio or vita,
grew more prevalent, Dragons appear with increasing frequency in di-
rect confrontation with holy saints. As figures meant to be the purest
example of Christian holiness, warrior-saints who battled Dragons em-
ulatedbothChrist’sultimatedefeatof theDevil andthepaganherowho
grappled with the dark. Though victorious in the moment, the saints
often faced gruesome deaths due to their proclamation or dedication
of the truths revealed within their confrontation. Typically, this truth
was the power of Christ, which enables holy men and women to chal-
lenge a Dragon. After a saint-Dragon encounter, the saint would use
their victory as a testimony of their holiness and call for the immediate
conversion of witnesses or would-be victims. In texts spanning from
early Christianity to the late Middle Ages, saints such as St. Benedict, St.
Margaret (also known as St. Palagia), St. Theodore, St. Martha, various
local saints, and, most famously, St. George encountered Dragons in
the midst of their holy lives.
42 Solomon and Saturn I , trans Craig Williamson, (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2017), line 32.
43 Ibid, lines 197–200.




St. George has become one of the most well-known saints in West-
ern Christianity. He is the patron saint of England, Catalonia, Georgia,
Portugal, Malta, Gozo, Palestinian Christians, the Romani people, the
protector of Bulgaria, Beirut, and Lebanon as well as of many others
who honor his name. It is difficult to find an English church without
imagery of either St. George or his Dragon. Despite the fact that George
was a Greco-Roman Tribune whose earliest passio describes his adven-
tures primarily taking place in Africa, northern Europeans latched on to
his story with fervor. There are traces of English veneration predating
the Norman invasion. No less than two sites in England alone claim to
be the location of the famed Dragon-St. George encounter. The tomb of
St. George, supposedly martyred in 303 CE in Lydda, attracted the atten-
tion of early European crusaders. A military and aristocratic cult soon
developed; Richard the Lionheart is recorded to have been the first to
have introduced the saint to England. As wandering crusaders brought
back myriad stories of his illustrious life to Europe, his list of deeds
grew exponentially. By the 1340s, England had declared St. George the
patron of the Order of the Garter and by the fifteenth century he had
surpassed Edward the Confessor and St. Edmund as the country’s pa-
tron saint. The earliest written evidence of St. George’s encounter with
the Dragon is found in Jacobus de Voragine’s early thirteenth–century
The Golden Legend.45 The Italian chronicler and archbishop of Genoa
compiled one of the most popular collections of lives of the greater
saints of the Middle Ages. St. George can be found among the myriad
saint lives described; the popularity of this particular collection con-
tributed to the widespread acceptance of the insertion of the Dragon.
De Voragine’s story emulates both Revelation and traditional mythic
Dragon-hero confrontations in its attempt to establish St. George as a
holy warrior-saint who can overtake pagans as the archetypal hero.
Germanic kingdoms also latched onto the saint with fervor. In
the ninth century, Abbot Hatto established St. George’s church in the
monastic island of Reichenau. There, relics have been found in abun-
dance as generations of monks and pilgrims brought new finds to the
monastery. On the same island, a set of poems and hymns known as the
Georgslied were penned in Old High German. Hermann of Reichenau
wrote theHistoria sancti Georgii in the mid-eleventh century, which has
unfortunately been lost. Other sites dedicated to St. George include
45 Jacobus de Voragine,The Golden Legend, trans. William Granger Ryan (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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St. George’s Abbey in the Black Forest as well as the city of Freiburg
im Breisgau. Emperor Maximilian in the late fifteenth century chose
St. George as his personal tutelar. The widespread saint can also be
found on several coats of arms across Germanic territories. However,
St. George remains most prominently honored in England, India, and
Georgia.
De Voragine’s The Golden Legend became the accepted origin of St.
George’s Dragon encounter as it spread throughout Christiandom. In
this account, the Roman Tribune George was traveling to the city of
Silena, in the province of Lybia, and came across a vast lake that housed
a poison-breathing Dragon. The Dragon would make a daily journey
to the city and curse its citizens with its poison. In order to appease
the Dragon, the city routinely placed two sheep near the lake as an of-
fering. However, the city quickly ran out of sheep and grew desperate.
It was decided that a lot would be taken for a young man or woman
to take the place of one of the sheep. This was sufficient to abate the
Dragon until the king’s only daughter was chosen as Silena’s sacrifice.
In the king’s refusal to let his child go, the city suffered several days of
miserable attacks from the enraged Dragon. Finally, the princess was
chained and offered to the Dragon to fulfill their contract. St. George
finds the princess and, despite her warnings, vows to fight the beast. He
conquers the Dragon and binds its poisonous maw with the princess’s
girdle. St. George then beseeches the town to convert to Christianity,
claiming it was only through Christ’s power he had been able to con-
quer the Dragon. The warrior-saint continued to perform miracles of
military might until his ultimate martyrdom by Emperor Diocletian for
his refusal to renounce Christ. Later adaptations of this passio describe
St. George as a warrior educated in a Faerie court in central England.
The English and German tales retain the original story but also describe
a second Dragon encounter on Dragon Hill in Dunmore Heath, War-
wickshire. According to local legend, the hill’s conspicuously bare top
is “where the [Dragon’s] blood ran out and nothing’ll grow on it since,
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not so much as a thistle.”46 Here, St. George defeats the Dragon but
dies soon thereafter due to exposure to his poison.47
The Late Middle Ages bear witness to the slow transition from mute
to verbal Dragons. Even de Voragine’s thirteenth-century foe embod-
ies human rather than animalistic qualities. The wrath, vengeful spirit,
and ultimately cowardly nature of the Dragon reminds the audience of
the character of Satan. Rather than purely animalistic, this Dragon is
bestial, or demonic. A true creature of vengeance, St. George’s Dragon
wreaks havoc against the city that failed to fulfill its contract. Just as
the fallen angel may be a destructive force in his prime, he is no match
against a saint armed with the true power of Christ. In rather explicit
symbolism for an individual’s grapple with temptation, St. George con-
quers the Dragon by not only defeating him with military strength but
by permanently closing his mouth. The Dragon is powerless without ac-
cess to his poison and becomes a cowardly beast. Likewise, the Devil’s
poisonous words become powerless against Christians armed with Bib-
lical truth. In fact, George binds the Dragon with the princess’s girdle.
This lends itself towards interpretation as the Belt of Truth described
in Ephesians 6:10–14. The Dragon is thus rendered helpless in the face
of the truth of Christ.
A saint is meant to be a representative of the ideal hero in faith; they
reach the highest aspirations of divine holiness and become elevated
as an intercessor between a believer and God. While the composer of a
passiomay not expect his readers to remain pure virgins or be martyred
for their faith, it is enough to translate the experiences of the saint into
daily life. St. George exists in the mythic past of Christian sainthood.
Later saints often looked back on the early centuries of Christian perse-
cution as the days in which sainthood was at its peak. St. George was an
ideal figure for veneration as both a Christian Roman soldier and a mar-
tyr of the infamous Diocletian. As a mythic hero, St. George encounters
the Dragon in a formulaic episode that reveals narrative-shaping truths.
Thus, St. George embodies the paramount qualities of a medieval saint
as well as a traditional Dragon slayer. De Voragine’spassiodescribes the
46 Thomas Hughes, The Scouring of the White Horse: Or, The Long Vacation Ramble
of a London Clerk andWhat Came of It; And, the Ashen Faggot, a Tale for Christmas
(London: Macmillan, 1892), 128.
47 Jannifer Westwood and Jacqueline Simpson,The Lore of the Land: A Guide to Eng-




Dragon encounter as the first of many merit-proving events. It is thus
in this skirmish that St. George initially proves his mettle as a warrior-
saint. In the confrontation with the Dragon, St. George employs his
faith and military virtue as weapons against a threat to the community.
Not only does he slay the Dragon, but he cows and humiliates his foe by
leading him tethered through the city. It is his actions that permanently
close the poisonous maw against further damage. Most significantly, it
is in the confrontation that the truth of his holiness is revealed. The citi-
zens of Silena have witnessed a testament to the veracity of St. George’s
faith and willingly accept it. However, it is the same evidence of his faith
that eventually leads to the warrior’s gruesome death.
On the other hand, in later English adaptions St. George dies after
a poisonous blow from the Dragon. In an addition highly similar to Be-
owulf , this indicates a purposeful shift towards familiar tropes. Here, St.
George remains a martyr, but it is his sacrificial quality that shines as an
example to believers thereafter. Regardless, St. George stands on a holy
pedestal. He defeats the chaotic, demonic plague that had stricken the
city through his intimate relationship to God. In this way, he is among
the truest of medieval heroes and represents the acme of humanity.
For if St. George can achieve this peak, so too can the average believer
conquer their own Dragons through their faith. This demonstrates the
centrality of the Christian faith as well as the persistent remnants of
the past within the Middle Ages. Just as in the early days of conversion
missionaries would adapt local practices towards Christianity, so does
the Dragon-hero encounter shift towards a distinctly religious center.
This episode became perhaps the most iconic moment of St. George’s
passio. It dramatically shifts the narrative from a depiction of an itin-
erant disciple to that of a warrior-saint. In some interpretations, this
is George’s final moment. The Dragon encounter is thus employed as
a marker of power and saintliness in which the saint reveals his true
colors.
St. George’s patronages stretch across Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and Asia. His image is continually invoked as a patriotic sym-
bol. For instance, England’s St. George’s Day is celebrated as a day of
national pride. Similarly, posters made for World War I depicted the
English St. George slaying a German-coded Dragon. One such poster
states that “Britain Needs You at Once,” associating the English citizen
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directly with the persona of St. George.48 Even in the early twentieth
century the saint was depicted as the acme of humanity to which the
average man must aspire. Here, the Dragon represents the country’s
enemy at the time, which is not only an abstract concept of violence
but a specific group of people. This image would not be possible or cul-
turally relevant, however, without the centuries of cultural retelling of
the saint as the hero that defeats the Dragon.
The Sound of Siegfried
Centuries later, Richard Wagner, the nineteenth-century German
composer, would pick up the same thread in his nationalistic series
of operas, theRing cycle. Following the contemporary trend of claim-
ing direct cultural descent from Germanic heroes such as Beowulf
or King Alfred, Wagner encouraged a revitalization in the Dragon
apart from Christian hagiography. In fact, an early version of theRing
cycle’s story can be found in lines 884–914 of Beowulf retold by the
bard in the Danish mead hall, Heorot. Picking up themes of Beowulf ,
the Nibelungenlied, and traditional Germanic folklore, Wagner wove
together a mythic opera for the nineteenth century. In this, he became
a participant in the effort began in the early eighteenth century to
find what it truly meant to be German. Roderick Cavalerio traces this
movement in which philosophers, artists, and linguists sought to find
what set them apart from their neighbors.49 The Grimm brothers had
attempted to define the illusive qualities and had concluded that it was
in traditional folk tales that the purity of national identity lay. Cavaliero
describes how the Grimms “were on a quest for the authentic voice of
a Germany which told of a strong, more enduring Germanic power,
rooted in its glorious past, the age of Minnesingers and alchemists
seeking gold.”50 They depicted a Germany in which its people lived in
fear of the forests and yet found heroes to conquer even the greatest
of foes. Even in distant Scotland, the philosopher Thomas Carlyle
believed that Germany was a “nursery for lesser deities … not gods but
48 Spottiswoode & Co. Ltd, “Britain Needs You at Once,” accessed March 24, 2018,
http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3g11248/.
49 Roderick Cavaliero, “Genius, Power and Magic: A Cultural History of Germany




they determined the destiny of human affairs and were designated as
heroes.”51
Wagner himself used mythic elements to tackle the supernatural,
psychological drama within the movement of self-definition. However,
his attempts are complicated; despite his strong distaste for anything
he perceived as distinctly non-German, his operas adapted traditions
from across the North Sea cultural sphere. In his works, the German
heroes, as described by Carlyle, surpass the gods and bring supernat-
ural rationality to the world once again. Cavalerio describes this as a
“creation of the new Valhalla, created by Wagnerian man not Wagner-
ian gods, makingTheRing, a farrago of dubious politics and morality, [a
part of] the national saga.”52 Wagner used traditional mythic elements
to describe a Germany in which myth has not only been surpassed but
also fulfilled by the German man. Here, heroism can be defined as the
ability to supersede the need for the pseudo-pagan past and yet simul-
taneously a culmination of qualities found idealized in the literature of
days gone by.
Wagner took mythic and folk elements and incorporated them into
a story that attempts to define German national character. In the third
installment of the Ring cycle, Siegfried, the titular character has been
raised by the scheming dwarf, Mime, in order to steal Wotan’s pow-
erful ring. This ring is currently in the possession of the giant-turned-
Dragon, Fafner. His greed for Wotan’s ring transformed him into a tan-
gible image of avarice and forced him to live as an exiled, bitter creature.
Due to many complications concerning contracts and greedy mistakes,
Siegfried is the only man who can forge the broken sword Nothung and
slay Fafner. In an attempt to understand the nature of fear, the hero
rushes off to confront the Dragon. The beguiling Dragon converses
freely with Siegfried, especially concerning the ways of the world and
fate. In the baritone traditionally reserved for operatic villains, Fafner
tells the fair hero about his transformation from man to Dragon due to
his desire for the ring. He also reveals Mime’s hidden scheme to take
the ring for himself, even at the cost of Siegfried’s life. These truths
transform the narrative and give new purpose to Siegfried’s quest. The
Dragon is of course killed and Siegfried goes on, eventually to his tragic





foe, his information is the catalyst for a new quest. Wagner’s Dragon
fits the later image of a lizard devoured by greed and deceit, but is also
the bearer of revelation for the hero. The mythic elements in these op-
eras are meant to recall the distinct Germanic character, and a Dragon
is uniquely suited for such a role.
A highly nationalistic series, Der Ring des Nibelungen was Wagner’s
attempt at an inherently German tale. While Victorian contemporaries
romanticized the Anglo- Saxons in an effort to establish an ethnic
national pride, Wagner pulled from other tales in his efforts. In his
borrowings from Norse, Icelandic, Danish, and other Germanic tales
he created an idealized German hero in Siegfried. Siegfried is blonde,
valiant, and strong; he lets no dwarf or god manipulate his life. His
human dominance reigns secure throughout the opera; he is the pin-
nacle of humanism. He is a man brought up purely for the purpose
of slaying a Dragon and lives entirely without fear. This is in direct
contrast to Fafner, a giant consumed by greed, cowardice, and lethargy.
The Dragon hides in his barrow wallowing in the consequences of his
theft of Andvari’s ring. On the other hand, Siegfried’s brash behavior
allows him to see what he desires and take it for his own. Siegfried has
no interest in the weapons or hoard of the Dragon, only that the beast
can be killed in order to remove any potential of experiencing fear. The
conflict was meant to be his highest moment and a stepping stone to
greatness. However, it takes an unexpected turn during the lengthy
conversation between Fafner and Siegfried. The hero soon realizes
that he has come into contact with an alarming aspect of nature unlike
any he has encountered: a devourer. Just as the Dragon embodies the
hoarder and consumer of wealth so too does he embody the bestial
qualities of the hagiographic Dragon. He is a giant transformed into an
ungodly representation of avarice, not dissimilar to the demonic Drag-
ons described in saints’ lives. Fafner is not only a physical consequence
of greed but a container of truth. It is his knowledge of Wotan’s ring,
prophecies, and manipulation that dramatically change the narrative.
After Siegfried slays Fafner he consumes his blood, representing an
assimilation of his opponent.53 He has defeated the avarice of mankind
and eradicated fear from his life.
This confrontation reveals that Siegfried has become Wagner’s
model German hero. In his defeat of the Dragon, a quintessentially
53 Robert Donington, Wagner’s Ring and Its Symbols: The Music and the Myth, 3rd
Edition (Robert Donington, 1976), 197.
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native but negative element, he has destroyed an aspect of German
life that has potential to ruin communities. A fearless, ruddy hero thus
can defeat the gods and magic themselves; a man rules triumphant in
this moment. Even in their conversation, the human overcomes the
supernatural Dragon. Wagner sought a pure, unadulterated hero; his
nationalism had led him to a search throughout myth in order to iden-
tify unifying characteristics of Germanic peoples.54 This reflects post
Enlightenment humanism that prioritizes the rationality of mankind
over dependence on religious tradition. Meanwhile, nationalism was
on the rise across Europe. As people groups sought to define them-
selves by seemingly apparent “native” qualities, they glorified mythic
heroes as pure examples of their nationhood. Harkening back to “pa-
gan,” pre-Christian days, Wagner depicts humanity without the influ-
ence of God. To him, the Dragon-slaying and treasure-gaining serves
to identify Siegfried as the archetypal mythic hero with whom an au-
dience can empathize. The precedents for such an arc can be found in
mythic literature and opera.
Years earlier, Mozart had attempted a similar object in his only Ger-
man opera,DieZauberflöte. In an attempt to identify his protagonist as a
distinctly German hero, Mozart opens the opera with a Dragon-slaying.
Likewise, Wagner purposefully gathered mythic sources, inevitably
leading to the downfall of the hero, in which a measure of deceit is al-
ways involved. Siegfried, the pinnacle of humanity, must also exit the
world that has no place for him. He has defeated magical features, aided
and overwhelmed the gods, and won the unconquerable woman for his
own. He has become the myth that was meant to be receding and must
therefore also end. This allows for Wagner’s philosophical message of
the primacy of German people to flourish; the average man can now as-
pire to Siegfried’s greatness without fearing his rule. The ideal German,
Siegfried, defeats various supernatural symbols of other people groups
and religions. Rather than simply conquering the Devil Siegfried over-
comes anybody who dares to come in his way. This is a secularized saint
life that draws on pre-Christian narratives to emphasize the abilities
of mankind to accomplish their own supernatural feats. For Wagner,
the German people are idealized in Siegfried and although they cannot
attain his perfection, they are the closest on earth to doing so. Their ide-
alized qualities of strength, valor, and brash humanism are perfected in
54 Nancy Benvenga,Kingdom on the Rhine: History,Myth, and Legend inWagner’s Ring
(New York, NY: Anton Press, 1983), 34.
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the operatic hero. Unlike the Nibelung dwarf, coded with anti-Semitic
stereotypes, the German can conquer all that is in their path without
fear. The audience must also defeat greed and the old gods in favor of
human strength.
This message was embraced and later celebrated by the Weimar
Republic and the Nazi regime as representing the zenith of humanity
within the German people. These later audiences received Wagner’s
message that the gods and outside influences must yield the stage
to humans in “hopes that the latter will succeed in putting things
right.”55 Wagner’s ideal Germanic hero, identified primarily in his
Dragon-slaying, thus became known as an artistic rendition of the Nazi
interpretation of the racial apex of mankind. Not only asserting their
own characteristics but defining themselves by displaying what they
are not was highly appealing to the Nazis. Wagner’s own anti-Semitic
views can be found throughout the Ring cycle. He derogatorily based
the Nibelung dwarfs on Jewish stereotypes; the conniving dwarf Mime
can be easily seen as a representation of the anti-Semitic belief that
the Jewish people are inherently greedy and untrustworthy.56 These
sentiments are also found in Fafner. His greed and tendency to sit on
wealth lead to his ultimate demise at the hand of the ideal German
hero. Wagner, in an attempt to create a national superlative, wove his
prejudices into stories that were in fact borrowed themselves from
other cultures. A precursor to Nazism, this type of national, or racial,
pride is especially evident in this particular Dragon-hero encounter.
In a Hole in theMountain There Lived aDragon
During and after the World Wars, another author made attempts to
construct a national mythology from Germanic texts. A young man
steeped in Dragons, language, and the mythic past changed the world
whenhebeganto tell storiesaboutafictionalworldcalledMiddleEarth.
J. R. R. Tolkien’s myriad works completely reinvented the fantasy genre
and take their root in stories from across the North Sea cultural sphere.
Born at the end of the Victorian Era, Tolkien was a remarkably conser-
vative man who nevertheless made tremendous leaps in the medievalist
55 Benvenga,Kingdom on the Rhine, 165–166.
56 MarcA. Weiner,RichardWagner and the Anti-Semitic Imagination (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Pres, 1995).
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and literary communities. Fortunately for him, his scholarly training
came at the forefront of the revitalization of medieval studies. When
his peers were dedicating themselves to the Classical world, Tolkien
was poring over Old English, Norse, and Icelandic grammar textbooks.
As a young man, he had fought in World War I and saw the turmoil that
would later come to define him.57 He witnessed his peers die in droves
around him at the Battle of the Somme and lost all but one of his clos-
est friends. However, unlike other writers of the day, Tolkien retreated
into the mythic past for comfort. While his contemporaries, such as T.S.
Eliot or Rupert Graves, were attempting to shake off the influence of
mythic heroism, Tolkien sought to find any remnant of valor in human-
ity. Even while he lay in the hospital stricken with trench fever, Tolkien
dreamed of a mythology for England.58 His myriad complicated lan-
guages found a home in Middle-Earth, the supposed mythic past of the
British Isles. Tolkien’s legendarium was meant to give England an epic
entirely its own; he thought little of the Welsh-French Arthurian tales
and believed that Beowulf was the most relevant epic for England. Yet
even that was inherently a Danish tale, merely recorded in Old English.
Picking up on the contemporary trend towards nativism and yet see-
ing that English culture was largely an amalgamation of many others,
Tolkien desired something that was purely his own. Tolkien therefore
used his extensive breadth of knowledge in northern European lan-
guage and mythic history to construct a story for his people.
Tolkien participated in the latest developments of scholarship in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The overarching
mood of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic scholars of the day was about
looking into a Germanic past to find qualities that a modern audience
could embody. For some, this took on a racial element. A resurgence in
Anglo-Saxon studies had come as a late Victorian effort to epitomize
their supposed racial qualities. An obsession with Alfred the Great and
his cohorts took aristocrats by storm while they attempted to claim di-
57 John Garth, Tolkien and the Great War: The Threshold of Middle-Earth (London:
Harper Collins, 2011).
58 In a 1951 letter, Tolkien wrote: “I was from early days grieved by the poverty of
my own beloved country: it had no stories of its own … I had a mind to make a
body of more or less connected legend, ranging from the large and cosmogonic, to
the level of romantic fairy-story … which I could dedicate simply to: to England;
to my country.” J.R.R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien: A Selection. Compiled




rect descent from their race. Largely, this concept was paired with the
height of the rampant imperialism of the British Empire. In a sense, this
helped some to justify their conquests by demonstrating their supposed
superiority in cultural and racial descent. The term Anglo-Saxon came
to be culturally associated with the supremacy of the British monarchy
and people of Caucasian European ancestry.
Tolkien himself believed there was a great pride to be had in being
a descendent of the Germanic tradition. However, although Tolkien
deeply regretted how scholars alienated Germanic studies after the
World Wars, he abhorred Nazi beliefs.59 For Tolkien, the mythic past
held a wonder that the technology-ridden modernity lacked. He looked
at mythic literature as holding truly native qualities. As a revolutionary
scholar of Beowulf , it would have been impossible for Tolkien to have
not been influenced when writing his own works. He saw Beowulf as
one of the prime examples of heroism in mythic literature. Tolkien
also drew on texts such as the Finnish Kalevala, Icelandic sagas, the
Nibelungenlied, and myriad languages to construct an idealized picture
of an early medieval mythic realm. Of the utmost importance was to
communicate the mythic heroism in his works, although he chose to
adapt traditional ideas for a unique perspective.
Many elements of Tolkien’s universe can trace their history back to
medieval texts, including his many Dragons. His first published fiction,
the children’s bookTheHobbit, features a Dragon-hero confrontation
at the climax of the drama. The book follows Bilbo Baggins, a diminu-
tive Hobbit, on his unexpected adventure employed as ‘the burglar’ of
Thorin’s Company. Thorin Oakenshield reluctantly hires the Hobbit
at the recommendation of Gandalf to help the dwarves reclaim their
homeland from Smaug the Terrible. Along with twelve dwarves and
a disgruntled wizard, Bilbo encounters immense spiders, wood Elves,
and the Dragon that stole Thorin’s inheritance. They eventually reach
the Lonely Mountain and the ruins of Erebor, only to find the Dragon
59 After being asked byGermanpublishers if hewas of Aryan descent, Tolkien called
Nazism a “wholly pernicious and unscientific race-doctrine,” and mocked the
original letter by replying as if they had asked about the original meaning of the
word. He said “I am not of Aryan extraction: that is Indo-iranian...but if I am to
understand that you are enquiring whether I am of Jewish origin, I can only reply
that I regret that I appear tohaveno ancestors of that giftedpeople...if impertinent
and irrelevant inquires of this sort are to become to rule...then the time is not far
distant when a German name will no longer be a source of pride.” Tolkien, The
Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 37–38.
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still alive. Bilbo is sent into the hoard to spy on the Dragon and steal
treasure; however, it is this theft that arouses Smaug and leads to the
riddling talk between the Hobbit and his foe. After Smaug correctly
assumes that the Company was aided by Men of Esgaroth, he leaves
the mountain and destroys the nearby town. He is slain by the grim
Bard, but at great cost. Nonetheless, Elves, Men, and Dwarves turn to
the Dragon hoard and crave its wealth. It is only the arrival of mutual
enemies that stops a confrontation driven by greed. The novel’s climax
is the terrible battle of Elves, Men, and Dwarves against the Orcs and
Wargs of Dol Guldur and Gundabad. Thorin and two Dwarf princes of
the Company are slain, but Bilbo safely returns to the Shire laden with
Dragon gold.
Fully aware of the long mythic history of the Dragon, Tolkien en-
sured that the conflict would embody all that an audience might antici-
pate. Many scholars today have recognized that his childhood fascina-
tion with Dragons contributed greatly to his participation in the genre.
Caroline McAlister’s children’s book, John Ronald’s Dragons: The Story
of J. R. R. Tolkien, artistically describes how Tolkien imaged a world of
Dragons as an escape for the dreariness of reality.60 In a beautifully il-
lustrated book she follows the theme of Dragons throughout Tolkien’s
life. The natural association with the legendary author and the famous
mythic foe becomes even clearer when examining his many works. In
The Hobbit, the Dragon Smaug follows the script of his predecessors as
a mythic element. When Thorin’s Company is trying to find a way to
defeat the Dragon, they point out that only heroes can directly confront
a Dragon “but warriors are busy fighting one another in distant lands,
and in this neighbourhood heroes are scarce.”61 Even Smaug falsely
believes that he has killed all “the warriors of old and their like is not in
the world today.”62 This is a recognition of the explicit Dragon-hero en-
counter, which Tolkien then purposefully reconstructs to toy with the
trope. Rather than describing a traditional scene in which the hero de-
stroys the Dragon himself, Tolkien sends the meek Bilbo to first engage
in a battle of wits. Once the company reaches the Lonely Mountain,
Bilbo manages to steal a cup and enrage the Dragon. In their next en-
counter, the Hobbit and the Dragon engage in a tete-a-tete, because “no
60 CarolineMcAlister, John Ronald’s Dragons: The Story of J.R.R. Tolkien (NewYork,
NY: Roaring Book Pres, 2017).




dragon can resist the fascination of riddling talk and of wasting time
trying to understand it.”63 Here, Bilbo embodies both elements of the
thief and hero, fulfilling his purpose within the company. His heroic
qualities find life in the courage it takes for a small creature, unused to
the heroic realm, to confront a Dragon. However, in their conversation,
Smaug taunts Bilbo repeatedly and plants mistrust in the dwarves’ hon-
esty and motives. This drives the company apart and precipitates the
climactic Battle of Five Armies.
However true the Dragon’s remarks may have been, their delivery
as half-truths planted seeds of mistrust within Bilbo’s heart. His later
actions of hiding the Arkenstone, Thorin’s birthright, are directly in-
fluenced by the words of Smaug. Though the Dragon is killed by Bard
of Esgaroth, his words ultimately lead to the death of the novel’s hero,
Thorin. The Dragon’s victim is not Bilbo, as he is not the hero; Bilbo is
the bourgeois protagonist who comes to understand the heroic world,
but he never becomes the mythic hero. When the dwarves complain
that he awoke the Dragon by stealing the cup, Bilbo scoffs “I was not
engaged to kill dragons, that is warrior’s work, but to steal treasure.
I made the best beginning that I could.”64 Thorin, on the other hand,
is the noble prince exiled from his homeland. His actions follow that
of the mythic hero; the dwarf’s wandering life is reminiscent of the
exiled Wanderer in the Anglo-Saxon heroic elegies, the Wandering Jew,
or the hidden identity motifs of medieval romantic ballads. Thorin’s
downfall is thus a direct result of the Dragon encounter. His yearn-
ing for the Arkenstone and the Dragon treasure, a desire avoided by
Beowulf and Siegfried, propels him to battle against armies of men
and Elves. Here, Thorin is the hero fallen from heroic glory and ideals.
Tolkien also emulates Beowulf by having a thief disturb the Dragon.
Although Tolkien later claimed in a letter that he had not intended to
duplicate the Dragon encounter to such a great extent, the texts are
remarkably similar. He admits that perhaps he subconsciously derived
the scene from Beowulf , but that was only due to his intensive work on
the subject. He wrote, “though it was not consciously present to the
mind in the process of writing, in which the episode of the theft arose
naturally … It is difficult to think of any other way of conducting the
story at that point. I fancy the author of Beowulf would say much the




same.”65 In Beowulf , the thief is forced by his master to retrieve part
of the hoard of his ancestors. Bilbo recreates this scene when he reluc-
tantly agrees to ‘burgle’ the treasure of Thorin’s grandfather, Thror.
Bilbo even steals a two-handled cup just as Beowulf ’s thief did. Bard,
the descendent of the great defender of the city of Dale, uses an ancient
arrow to slay the Dragon though not without the destruction of Lake-
town. He too embodies the qualities of the heroic world and fulfills the
ideals when Thorin fails. Bard is a true hero; it is for this reason that
he is the one to deal the Dragon’s death blow. Here, Tolkien employs
multiple heroic tropes in several characters, and it is only through their
joint effort that the Dragon is slain. It is the combination of Thorin’s
heroism, Bilbo’s ‘every-day’ bravery and Bard’s nobility of character
that slays the Dragon. Similar to Wiglaf’s intervention in Beowulf , the
hero, i.e. Thorin, cannot defeat his foe alone.
Tolkien follows traditional patterns for the many other Dragons in
his mythic stories. In fact, Tolkien felt as though he was improving upon
scenes from Beowulf, saying “But the whole problem of the intrusion of
the ’dragon’ into northern imagination and its transformation there is
one I do not know enough about.”66 Nevertheless, despite his protests
of having little technical knowledge of Dragons, Tolkien wove myriad
types into his stories. In hisThe Silmarillion, Ancalagon the Black, the
first of the winged Dragons created by the devil-figure Morgoth, is slain
by Earendil in the War of Wrath. Earendil is later doomed, or honored,
never to return to Middle Earth and to sail the skies as a star for all
eternity. Glaurung, Father of Dragons, is slain by the tragic hero Turin
Turambar. During the encounter, it is revealed by the twisted Dragon
that Turin has unknowingly married his sister and, after Glaurung is
slain, Turin takes his own life. Repeatedly throughout the legendarium,
a Dragon encounter spells the inevitable doom for the hero. Whether
they sacrifice their lives defeating their enemy or they are driven mad by
truths revealed, the hero stands no chance of a quiet ending. Tolkien’s
Dragons draw on both pre-Christian and Christianized images in order
to construct his ultimate fantasy of what a Dragon ought to be. As a
staunchly devoted Roman Catholic, Tolkien was deeply familiar with
hagiography. He was well aware of the Biblical influence on the Dragon
motif and incorporated the same trend into his own myths. They are
embodiments of evil created by Morgoth, the works’ Satan figure, and




are capable only of destruction and guile. As creatures of a substitute
Devil, they emulate the demonic Dragons of hagiography. Just as St.
George conquered the bestial demon, so Tolkien’s heroes expel Mor-
goth’s hateful influence from the battlefield.
Smaug has many of the characteristics that Tolkien himself loathed.
Like the ever-hoarding aristocracy, the Dragon sits on the wealth in his
domain and remains isolated. The beast viciously took his gold from
those unable to defend themselves, not unlike the rich who mercilessly
take advantage of the poor. Upon missing the cup that Bilbo initially
stole, Smaug felt “the sort of rage that is only seen when rich folk that
have more than they can enjoy suddenly lose something that they have
long had but never before used or wanted.”67 For Tolkien, this was one
of modern society’s gravest crimes. Having grown up desperately poor,
he resented those with stagnant wealth. He instead admired the ideals
of the Anglo-Saxon lords who shared their wealth generously with their
thanes. From his perspective, the aristocratic class was abusing their
position to harm the middle and lower classes of England. Although
Tolkien believed that a class system and monarchy were essential parts
of a functioning society, he saw the true enemies as those who abuse
their God-given position. Bilbo, Tolkien’s Victorian bourgeoisie, con-
fronts and mocks this arrogant behavior so that paragons of the Heroic
Age, Thorin and Bard, may defeat it. Bilbo is also a direct contrast to
the greed of Smaug and later the armies of Dwarves, Elves, and Men.
Even in the comparisons of their ‘waistcoats’, Smaug’s diamond to
Bilbo’s bright but plain fabric, they are seen to be entirely opposite.
In fact, Smaug’s confidence in his diamond-encrusted belly becomes
his downfall; he fails to account for a large gap in his scales that is per-
fect for an arrow strike. Although Bilbo is clearly of the well-off middle
class, he has no attachment to wealth for the mere sake of it. Like any
good Hobbit, he freely gives gifts and prioritizes simple comfort over
money. These are Tolkien’s ideal English qualities.
Bilbo is a part of his community of both Hobbits and the heroic
world; as a respected member of society, he enjoys personal connec-
tions and as an observer of the ways of heroes he emulates their behav-
ior when necessary. The Dragon is part of this mythic world that seems
apart from the Shire, but he is defeated by its homegrown values. Thus,
Tolkien’s ideal hero may be revealed as not simply a great warrior of the
67 Tolkien,The Hobbit, 229.
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Heroic Age but a person of courage who does what they must in order
to defeat evil. Certainly heroes and warriors are found throughout The
Silmarillion,TheHobbit, andThe Lord of the Rings, but the most endear-
ing protagonists are diminutive and hardy. It is Bilbo’s resistance to
greed and power over others that allows him to remain untarnished
by the Dragon hoard. Unlike the Dragon who is violent for the sake
of it, malicious, and slothful, Bilbo strikes only when pressed. It is his
simplicity that directly contrasts the drama of the heroic world found
in Thorin and the Dragon. Likewise, it is his simple desire for comfort
that enables his immunity to the draw of the hoard. His courage in the
unknown and his stalwart hope in the goodness of everyone is what
prevents catastrophe. Tolkien sends a message to his readers that a true
English hero can be of common stock and successful even in the heroic
world if they hold true to hope and courage in the face of monsters.
TheDragon –Author Encounter
Tolkien’s contribution to the academic sphere revolutionized medieval,
language, and literature studies. However, he is most remembered for
his remarkable reinvention of the fantasy genre. By focusing his fiction
in a pseudo-medieval world, Tolkien brought the medieval back into
the forefront of popular culture. In particular, the mid-late twentieth
century saw an explosion of fantasy literature and related activities.
Role playing table top games, such as Dungeons and Dragons, or Live
Action Role Play that imitate Tolkien’s legendarium came to be a part
of the fan subculture. Suddenly hundreds of thousands of readers were
poring over Tolkien and similar authors. It had become popular litera-
ture rather than simply the interest of medieval scholars. Since then,
fantasy has largely been defined by the example set byThe Lord of the
Rings.
Participating in the growing interest in medievalist studies, the
American scholar John Gardner took traditional themes and set them
in a contemporary reality. Although Gardner himself is American, he
grew up heavily entrenched in European culture; his ancestors had mi-
grated from England to become farmers and kept many of their tradi-
tions. His mother was an English teacher who would often read Shake-
speare to her children. However, of his long English ancestry, “the John
Gardner of our time never knew these details. However, his attraction
to myth, to the old and archetypical played out in human character, was
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clearly spawned on fertile ground.”68 Barry Silesky, in his biography
JohnGardner; LiteraryOutlaw, records how Gardner’s first engagement
with myth was a children’s fable titled “Dragon, Dragon.”69 The story
describes “a distinctly contemporary dragon … with the conflicted
consciousness of a contemporary adult,” and is “informed by [Gard-
ner’s] engagement with medieval myth.”70 This was Gardner’s first
literary entanglement with mythic Dragons but it was his 1973Grendel
that presented the world with his interpretation of the element. A me-
dievalist himself, Gardner purposefully inserted literary commentary
within his adaptation. In his novel, he was able to contribute to Beowulf
and mythic criticism through narrative instead of essay. Indulging this
attraction, Gardner rewrote Beowulf from the perspective of Grendel,
the hero’s first foe. The novel is meant to speak to contemporary prob-
lems and, according to Kenneth Mason, “to describe luxation we must
face simply by virtue of living in the latter decades of the twentieth cen-
tury.”71 Its careful structure of twelve chapters, each coinciding to both
zodiac and Aristotelean virtues, demonstrates Gardner’s engagement
with a larger sphere of spirituality.72 Critically acclaimed and loved by
literary scholars, the novel presents an interesting twentieth century
perspective on the nature of heroism and the Dragon encounter.
The story follows Grendel’s perspective throughout the first half of
Beowulf . One of the many challenges Gardner faced was the problem of
telling a story from the point of view of a character that dies in the first
half. Nevertheless, the story has Grendel meet every character of signif-
icance from the original poem, including the Dragon himself. Primarily,
the novel follows Grendel’s search for self-identification. He digests
qualms of morality, the purpose of individuality, and the very notions
of heroism. Grendel also becomes both entranced and conflicted by
the arrival of the Shaper, a singer who gives poetic meaning to the bru-
tality of the Danish life. Grendel initially scoffs at the proclamation
that Hrothgar’s brutes could be called heroic but is eventually captured
68 Tolkien,The Hobbit, 9.
69 Barry Silesky, John Gardner: Literary Outlaw (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books
of Chapel Hill, 2004), 93.
70 ibid., 93, 223.
71 Kenneth C. Mason, “Of Monsters and Men: Sartrean Existentialism and John
Gardner’s Grendel,” in Thor’s Hammer, ed. Jeff Henderson (Conway, AR: Univer-
sity of Central Arkansas Press, 1988), 101.
72 Barry Fawcett and Elizabeth Jones, “The Twelve Traps in John Gardner’ s Gren-
del,” American Literature 62, no. 4 (1990): 634, doi:10.2307/2927072.
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by the idea that, perhaps, meaning can be made within the disorder.
In his quest to find meaning in the seemingly chaotic universe, Gren-
del approaches the Dragon that will later fight Beowulf. The Dragon
claims omniscience and infinite wisdom, yet his inherent bitterness
clouds his judgement. His wisdom is applicable only for himself, not for
the grasping mind of a would-be philosopher. The Dragon’s winding
words are condescending as the monster attempts to understand the
purpose of his life. Throughout their conversation, Grendel attempts
to wheedle useful information out of the Dragon, but instead receives
a lesson on the nature of the universe. The Dragon scoffs at Grendel’s
desire to abandon his war on humans and says:
Ah, Grendel! You improve them, my boy! Can’t you see
that yourself? You stimulate them! You make them think
and scheme. You drive them to poetry, science, religion, all
that makes them what they are for as long as they last. You
are, so to speak, the brute existent by which they learn to
define themselves. The exile, captivity, death they shrink
from – the blunt facts of their mortality, their abandon-
ment - that’s what you make them recognize, embrace!
You are mankind, or man’s condition: inseparable as the
mountain climber and the mountain.73
In this moment, the Dragon becomes the central antagonist in Beowulf
and the manipulative force behind all actions against humanity. The
Dragon urges Grendel to continue to wage his war with Hrothgar, even
if it seems foolish. He neglects, however, to tell Grendel that this will
result in his gruesome death and the novel’s protagonist meets his end
when he takes the Dragon’s advice to heart.
Grendel is not simply a modern reimagining of an ancient text. It
is an example of Gardner’s dalliance with the implications of the Jean-
Paul Sartre philosophy. The Sartre philosophy stems from the idea that
a person’s existence is before their essence. In short, individuals cannot
be defined by themselves but instead by the projection of another.74
For example, the Dragon proposes that the Danes can only define them-
selves against the brutish attacks of Grendel while Grendel can define
73 Gardner,Grendel, 72–73.
74 Jean-Paul Sartre, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2013, ed. Edward N.




himself as mankind’s enemy. A self- pronounced detester of existen-
tialism, Gardner intended his novel to expose the dangers of such a
nihilistic worldview; particularly, in that the Sartre philosophy is a pre-
carious model for life.75 In fact, it is in accepting this philosophy that
leads Grendel to his gruesome death. Throughout the novel Grendel
despairs of the mechanization of the universe and declares that it is
all meaningless. At first, he is dedicated to the philosophy that noth-
ing but himself matters; after a bull attacks him he realizes that the
world moves on mechanically, and that “the world was nothing … I
understood that, finally and absolutely, I alone exist.”76 He lacks the
imagination to see the possibility of significance in an individual’s ac-
tions.
Marie Nelson describes the reinvention of Grendel from a mute
monster into a protagonist of both monstrous and human qualities.77
Shifting from a bestial figure to a would-be philosopher, Grendel en-
compasses the highest and lowest of humanity. He grapples with the
very nature of heroism, strangely attracted and yet repulsed by the
seeming simplicity of the mindset. However, despite this, Grendel is
not a hero in the word’s truest sense. In fact, he finds Beowulf’s belief
in heroic ideals to be deeply disturbing, musing that “he was insane”
to hold to such a truth.78 Jealous of the arrival of Beowulf, the Dan-
ish thane Unferth resolves to supersede his example by defeating the
monster himself. During his confrontation with, and subsequent hu-
miliation of the Dane, Grendel dismisses the aspiring hero’s motiva-
tion. Unferth argues that “the hero sees beyond what’s possible. That’s
the nature of a hero. It kills him, of course, ultimately. But it makes
the whole struggle worthwhile.”79 Grendel chooses not to honor this
worldview and purposefully shames Unferth by refusing to allow him
a heroic death. Instead of fulfilling the role of a champion of the Heroic
Age, Grendel is the modern hero seeking truth in a nihilistic world. He
stands outside the mead hall, attracted to the songs of glory and battle
but skeptical of their validity. However, it is his rejection of the heroic
ideals that leads him to his demise.
75 Mason, “Of Monsters and Men,” 101–102.
76 Gardner,Grendel, 22.
77 Marie Nelson, “John Gardner’s Grendel: A Story Retold and Transformed in the
Process,” Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 18, nos. 3/17 (2007): 431.
78 Gardner,Grendel, 142.
79 ibid., 89 .
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Gardner’s Dragon is a manipulative, deceptive, and bitter charac-
ter. Some have speculated that he might speak for Gardner, particularly
in his derision for a simplistic existentialist philosophy. However, Gard-
ner himself said that “the Dragon looks like an oracle, but he doesn’t lay
down the truth … he tells us the truth as it appears to a Dragon … that
is the materialistic point of view.”80 The Dragon’s primary advice is for
everyone to find a hoard of gold and mind it. Whereas the Shaper as-
signs life to a bloody reality and allows man to have reason for hope, the
Dragon encourages men to fall to the nihilism of greed. Leonard Butts
suggests that Gardner’s Dragon is an “aspect of human nature that can-
not be ignored but should not be trusted.”81 In this way, the Dragon
can be understood as a physical embodiment of the characteristics that
would destroy humanity. For Gardner, this means avarice, nihilism,
and existentialist fatalism. The Dragon may eventually be slain by the
heroic ideal, but his attitude remains a threatening influence.
Not merely a representation of greed but of a malicious enforcer of
fate, the Dragon influenced the supposed free will of the protagonist.
Once again, it is the Dragon-hero encounter that dramatically changes
the narrative. A seeker of truths, Grendel is Gardner’s ideal twentieth-
century philosophical hero. The enemy becomes a character that hides
meaning behind serpentine schemes that strip Grendel of his potential.
In fact, even in the violent confrontation between Beowulf and Grendel
the monster can only see the Dragon in his foe. Before the hero tears
Grendel’s arm he is seemingly transmogrified into the Dragon, his
fingers sting like fans, his eyes gleam red, his tongue spits
bright fire. While Beowulf violently asserts that heroism
is the only mode of human survival, Grendel’s worldview
crumbles. Grendel hears the Dragon’s words swirling
about his ears, whispers of dust and randomness.82
It is in this moment that Grendel realizes the Dragon’s pseudo-Sartre
philosophy is a destructive force. Whereas Grendel is constantly
searching and seeking absolution, the Dragon supposedly possesses
all knowledge yet refuses to enlighten others. Like a materialistic lord,
this Dragon hoards knowledge and refuses to bequeath his vast wealth
80 Mason, “Of Monsters and Men,” 106.
81 Leonard C. Butts, The Novels of John Gardner: Making Life Art as a Moral Process




to others. The negative aspects of deception and bitterness are cou-
pled with arrogance to create a picture of the worst aspects of deities
and fate. For Gardner, the Dragon is the antithetical image of the
truest heart of mankind that is aware of its flaws yet seeks redemption
regardless.
Gardner represents the rupture moment for the Dragon symbol.
After centuries of typified behavior and expectations, the author be-
comes aware of the implicit philosophies and rejects them. Gardner
recognized that the Dragon represented the opposite of the hero. As a
mythic element of greed and unpleasant truths, the Dragon was alto-
gether too explicit for him. Rather than wholly participating in the
traditions of the mythic element, the author once again adapts the
Dragon for his own purposes. Here, however, the purpose is to detach
himself from the rules established by the past. Gardner fundamentally
dislikes the implicit philosophy of the Dragon. Whereas in tales pre-
vious the Dragon represents an unpleasant reality to be defeated, here
the Dragon symbolizes the lies of the universe. There is no truth to be
gained within the deceits spilling from his mouth, and it is the belief
in his words that leads Grendel to his death.Grendel shows the decline
of the textual rulebooks. If the Dragon is the foil of the hero, then in
Gardner the foil can no longer function because the hero has become
aware of it. In other words, the Dragon no longer wholly reflects the
idealized northern European because the author and community are
aware of the process.
True, Gardner participates in the tradition in his rejection of the
longstanding rules. However, it is at this moment that the Dragon be-
gins to become a more animalistic trope in fantasy literature. The re-
jection of the element allows it to be reinterpreted. Dragons simply
become an attribute of a magical world rather than the antithesis to the
mythological self. Similarly, the fantastic genre was largely shaped by
Tolkien’s example. Authors spilled rivers of ink attempting to create
worlds similar in depth and clarity to that of Middle Earth. For this
reason, many of the tropes found within Tolkien’s works have now be-
come genre stereotypes. The pseudo-medieval setting, Elves, Dwarves,
Dragons, and magic are no longer remnants of a mythic past but sim-
ply markers of a magical world. Alternatively, dragons become a part
of a rational, natural world; they are categorized as an animal species
within the fictional universe.Dragonology by Ernest Drake puts forth
a pseudo-scientific study of the dragon genus as if they were a part of
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the natural world.83 For example, friendly dragons often appear in chil-
dren’s literature and popular culture. It is their presence rather than
their traditional characteristics that tells the audience that the world de-
scribed is imaginary. The dragons featured in the popular seriesGame
of Thrones are animalistic creatures that merely represent the return-
ing of magic to the fictional world rather than concepts of abstract
villainy. Likewise, the dragon encounters featured inHarry Potter and
The Goblet of Fire are obstacles in a sporting event rather than transi-
tional moments of revelation for the mythic hero. This disruption of
the mythic element implies a radical shift in the purpose of the Dragon.
It is no longer the ultimate reflection of mankind’s highest hero, but
a mere abstract representation of a magical realm. This is the image
that dominates popular culture today, but it too relies on centuries of
cultural heritage. Without the prioritization of the Dragon, it would
not have survived as so prevalent a trope.
Conclusion
Dragons to this day remain a significant feature of mythic and pseudo-
mythic literature. In Beowulf , the Christian author interjects the pre-
Christian description of the Dragon with Biblical allusions. The Chris-
tian motifs implanted in the Dragon have led to the current image
known today. These elements transformed the Dragon from a mythical
beast, perhaps symbolizing death and the unknown, into a deceiving
character with human traits. References to Satan in the Biblical book
of Revelation as a “great red dragon … that serpent of old” were also
combined with the pre-Christian Dragon so that it became a far more
malicious creature.84 In Wagner, the Dragon exemplifies the conse-
quences of greed and pride. Drawing from mythic representations and
supplying anti-Semitic stereotypes, Wagner constructed a Dragon an-
tithetical to his ideal hero. As the enemy of Siegfried, Fafner opposes
the intended representation of the “native” German people. Not only
is Siegfried able to conquer such serpentine vices, but he demonstrates
that Germany ought to as well. Tolkien combined images of his prede-
cessors to create the “most specially greedy, strong, and wicked worm
83 ErnestDrakeandDugaldSteer,Dr.ErnestDrakesDragonologyHandbook:APractical
Course in Dragons (Cambridge, MA: Candlewick Press, 2005).
84 Rev. 12:3–9 NKJV.
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called Smaug.”85 Smaug is the best of both worlds for Tolkien: a mon-
strous lizard and a subtle liar. Tolkien was well versed in medieval im-
ages of Dragons as well as Biblical ones and incorporated multiple influ-
ences into his mythology. Gardner employs the Dragon as the mythic
enemy of both his protagonist Grendel and the hero Beowulf, but the
novel exists in a meta space. It is fully aware of the tropes laid down be-
forehand and purposefully uses them to communicate a message about
rejecting accepted philosophies. Nevertheless, while a Dragon is ulti-
mately framed by an accepted set of characteristics each author uses
such a defined element for their own purposes. It is the shared cultural
history that connects various interpretations of Dragons across litera-
ture as well as settings within a historical context that sets individual
incarnations apart.
Although the presence of myth enhances a story, it cannot last.
Within the Secondary World of the narrative, mythic components are
an accepted part of the natural state of being. However, they are super-
natural in the sense that they must be confronted; they do not truly be-
long in what ultimately becomes a world of men. These stories describe
how the world of mankind came to be and thus the mythic elements
must fade, however tragic it may seem. In Beowulf , for example, all of
the fantastic components fade. The monsters and the hero must die.
Gardner aptly wrote that “the hero sees beyond what’s possible. That’s
the nature of a hero. It kills him, of course, ultimately. But it makes the
whole struggle worthwhile.”86 This passing makes their world a place
for mankind, with Beowulf as a heroic example and the monsters as
truths to be confronted. According to Tolkien, “[Beowulf ’s author] is
concerned primarily with man on earth, rehandling in a perspective
an ancient theme: that man, each man and all men, and all their works
shall die.”87 The hero is destined to be a model, a human that has be-
come supernatural in their victory over the mythic. They are the best
of humanity but they must fade so that the audience can look to their
example. Wagner’s operas continually show episodes of mankind de-
feating mythic elements. However, Siegfried must also tragically die
and leave the world ready for his successors. Tolkien’s works tackle the
tragic fading of myth, or Faerie, after the tradition of Beowulf . With
extreme attention to detail, Tolkien constructed an elaborate frame nar-
85 Tolkien,The Hobbit, 23.
86 Gardner,Grendel, 89.
87 Tolkien and Tolkien,TheMonsters and the Critics, and Other Essays, 119.
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rative and allowed his Elves to leave so that Middle Earth could become
pseudo-mythic history. Though his mythic elements are not necessar-
ily all destroyed by man, many of them confront each other. The Elves
clash with Sauron, the Dwarves battle the Wargs, and the Hobbits de-
stroy the ring. Moreover, although Gardner’s protagonist is mythic,
he is sacrificed for the brutal reality of mankind so that heroes such
as Beowulf can reach their zenith. One of the most mournful themes
found throughout mythic literature is the fading of mythic aspects. The
myth must make way for man.
Perhaps one of the most important questions that plague the
scholar is that of the reasoning behind mythic elements. Many readers
condemn such works for the ignorant barbarian past or the naive years
of childhood. Mythic elements surely cannot be in “serious literature”
for intellectual adults. Many historians dismiss the monsters inBeowulf
as distractions from the knowledge to be gained about Anglo-Saxon
culture, but the monsters are equally as informative, if not more so.
While removing myth from a story might make the literature more
“historical,” it makes it enormously less powerful as a narrative. With-
out mythic elements there is no elevation of spirit or possibility of
the highest peak to which mankind can aspire. Heroes within mythic
stories show communities what they could and ought to be. Most
significantly, it is in the conquering of their mythic foes that their true
character can be revealed.
Mythic scholarship has seen a shift in the past decades in that
mythic elements are regarded as not only important but, in fact,
essential to cultural understanding. Mythic components are highly
reflective of a culture’s priorities and self-image. The European Dragon
is uniquely distinct so that its presence implies cultural relevance. In
fact, elements such as the Dragon are extremely important and infor-
mative; fantastic elements reveal what a culture values and spends
time developing. Not only that, but simply how mythic elements are
treated demonstrates a culture’s ideals and self-perceptions. Authors
across the millennia have used mythic elements to create pictures of
the epitome of humanity. Heroes in such texts go above and beyond
normal human capacity and they demonstrate this through their
encounters with the fantastic. The hero becomes a mythic element
himself, but he is the myth of one who has reached the highest that
humanity can attain. He becomes a banner, a claim to a community’s
worth as a people group. Political movers are able to cling to these
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well-known images to inspire not only themselves, but their followers.
The cultural history of Europe has thus been shaped by Faerie stories
and geopolitics, mythic heroes and battles, and Dragons and kings.
The Dragon is in itself a reflection of northern Europe, essential to the
understanding of who northern Europeans believe they ought to be.
They have created their champions as pinnacles of their notions of
self-identity, but there are no heroes without monsters.
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Introduction
European integration, an experiment in unity and cooperation, was not
born from a concentrated, unified effort to unify the continent. Rather,
the European Union (EU) rose from a variety of agencies, organiza-
tions, and treaties spanning decades of renegotiation and uncertainty.
The EU’s present status is the product of an ongoing work-in-progress;
the Union’s member states did not set out to create one of the world’s
most ambitious projects in international cooperation. From overlap
in membership among the Union’s piecemeal progenitors, common
policy goals between cooperating states led to an increasingly shared
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mission in many, but not all, areas. However, no matter its present reach
across the continent, the EU is not the only vehicle for cooperation on
the continent. Independent organizations must balance their loyalties
between the monolithic EU and its own objectives. Cooperation and
coexistence is an imperative, but in an era of Euroscepticism defined by
the United Kingdom’s coming departure from the EU, organizations
can no longer take finding an effective path forward through the 21st
century future for granted.
TheEuropeanSpace Agency (ESA), an independent, highly success-
ful organization with close EU ties, faces an especially serious dilemma.
Deeply rooted in the postwar array of supranational organizations
which preceded the EU, the ESA owes its success to states shared with
the EU. Because of the so-called Brexit, the United Kingdom’s (UK)
stake as a founding ESA member and continually reliable partner for
European space collaboration is at risk. Caught squarely in the middle
of this messy separation, the ESA’s continued success will depend not
only on the precedent set by common Union membership but also on
the ESA’s self-determined and proven strategy. The ESA possesses a
long history as a uniquely independent organization in Europe, from
its early days gestating alongside the EU’s predecessors into its mod-
ern negotiations with the greater bloc. Its unique orbit, intersected by
both the dominating opinions coming from the Union in Brussels and
voices from outside the EU’s ken, cuts its own path among the players
of European integration. As integration faces severe doubts from both
within and abroad, highly effective but low-profile examples of coop-
eration, like that of the ESA, can remind the continent of integration’s
variegated past in the face of a seemingly black and white future.
Analyzing and understanding the ESA’s distinct role amidst Brexit
negotiations offers a similarly unique perspective on the Euroscep-
tic narrative dominating Europe. Between the lines of Brexit lies an
underutilized example of what Europe has already achieved coopera-
tively. The ESA’s role in Europe’s future is not necessarily restricted
to a detached, purely scientific voice. Rather, its half century of fruit-
ful partnerships between European powers set a precedent for how an
uncertain continent can right itself and press forward with the Euro-
pean dream. From its early days, the ESA overcame strong doubt and
harsh odds; a third player in space science, caught geographically and
temporally in the middle of the Cold War, was an ambitious project
on its own. Exacerbating the task were the early rumblings of British
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Euroscepticism manifesting in the state’s domestic and international
politics. However, the Agency’s predecessors overcame their humble,
contested origins before consolidating into the ESA as it is known today.
If the ESA is to continue its rich, cooperative legacy, that very history
is central to its continued success. Reflected against the Agency’s past
struggles with a similarly balky United Kingdom, the future of the tri-
partite relationship between the EU, the ESA, and the UK possesses
far more precedent than either the media or field-at-large have estab-
lished. As the UK continues its split from the European Union, its past
and present relationship with the ESA set a unique example on collab-
oration centered beyond both the EU’s seat in Brussels or state capitals
across the continent.
Literature Review
Kazuto Suzuki’s 2003 book, Policy Logics and Institutions of European
Space Collaboration, tackles the political realities of cooperative Euro-
pean endeavors through the lens of European space science. With a
comprehensive analysis of the modern European Space Agency’s for-
mation, history, and present combined with a thorough analysis of Eu-
rope’s intranational space programs, Suzuki works to establish a new
approach to the policy logics of European space cooperation. Rather
than applying a strict, historically appropriate international studies
model which prioritizes the rationality and independence, the piece
questions the neorealist approach’s assumptions on mechanisms of in-
ternational cooperation and expands the ability of transnational mech-
anisms of cooperation to exercise effective agency.
The crux of Suzuki’s argument is a rejection of neorealist assump-
tions about international organizations, particularly when applied to
space policy. The author defines neorealism as characterized by three
qualities; states are rational, seek to protect their autonomy, and the key
importance of intergovernmental bargaining. Decisions resulting from
this framework would naturally seek to benefit the individual state
over prioritizing international cooperation. Working on collaborative
projects may not necessarily be the best route for a nationalistic gov-
ernment, nor may collaboration on a sensitive and inherently security-
focused field like space science fit the narrative of national security. In
his analysis, Suzuki acknowledges the efficacy of these assumptions in
analyzing past frameworks; however, his focus instead rests on how
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“… the changes in policy logics and institutions are closely linked”
over time.1 Using the model set by the European Space Agency’s evolu-
tion alongside the EU from the twin agencies ELDO and ESRO, Suzuki
details the interplay between the neorealist approach and a more in-
ternational mindset to illustrate the medley of factors that have cre-
ated the modern European Space Agency’s niche between its member
states and the European Union. As an independent, international orga-
nization, the ESA must deal with an extensive network of regulations
and policies from both its member states and the EU. Though the ESA
is an independent organization, its funding, objectives, and contract
practice are the product of its member states’ space policies and the ob-
jectives put forth by the European Commission.Contracting for Space:
ContractPractice in theEuropeanSpaceSector, edited by Leslie Jane Smith
and Inigo Baumann, offers a collection of expert perspectives on the
evolution and practices of Europe in space. The 2011 book offers “…
a guide to the complex regulatory background of space projects and
an analysis of typical legal problems.”2 While procurement policies
and contract practice are the titular focus of the book, its participat-
ing authors offer a diverse array of perspectives on the relationship
between the ESA, its member states, and the EU. Gunilla Stjernevi and
Eleni Katsampani’s essay, “Space Contracting within the Framework of
the European Space Agency,” offers the unique perspective of two ESA
lawyers on the ESA’s legal status.3 Further pieces describe the coopera-
tive structure necessitated by the European model; otherwise, project
funding would likely run amok and create harmful overlap between
the three collaborating levels of European space policy. Thus,Contract-
ing for Space establishes the ESA’s “… own mandate in the format of
intergovernmental cooperation” in the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.4
1 Kazuto Suzuki, Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration,
(Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2003): 7.
2 Lesley Jane Smith and Inigo Baumann, ed.Contracting for Space: Contract Practice
in the European Space Sector, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 1.
3 Gunilla Stjernevi and Eleni Katsampani, “Space Contracting within the Frame-
work of the European Space Agency,” inContracting for Space: Contract Practice in
the European Space Sector, ed. Lesley Jane Smith and Inigo Baumann (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 169–181.
4 Bernhard Schmit-Tedd, “The Relationship between the EU and ESA within the
Framework of European Space Policy and its Consequences for Space Industry
Contracts,” inContracting for Space: Contract Practice in the European Space Sector,
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European space policy, despite its unique status as a topic that
brings together European national politics, integration, and science
policies, is not a widely researched topic. As Suzuki introduces his book,
he touches on the “… scarcity of social scientific research on European
space collaboration,” especially for a non-European researcher.5 As
this work approaches a similar field, its sources are similarly varied
and draw from a wide range of publications over an extended period.
Additionally, in its examination of Brexit and the United Kingdom’s
role in European space policy, the work makes thorough use of works
regarding British politics and the origins of the ruling Conservatives’
Euroscepticism. Though these works are not explicitly writing on
European space policy, their content weaves the fabric of the ESA’s
complex relationship with its national and supranational partners in a
post-Brexit Europe.
Historical accounts of European space policy are key to character-
ize and support the ESA’s current mandate. R. Lüst’s 1965 article in
the journal Science, “The European Space Research Organization,” de-
scribes the conditions under which the ESA’s predecessor organiza-
tions, ELDO and ESRO, were created and their original objectives for
operation. Written in 1965, the piece demonstrates what was intended
for the twin organizations before any major hiccups could intervene.6
John Walsh’s 1967 article in the same publication details a very dif-
ferent picture and illustrates the early problems created by Europe’s
launcher wing. Though ESRO did not lack problems, ELDO’s cost over-
runs and dysfunctional oversight nearly caused the United Kingdom to
withdraw from the organization, as “… ELDO was then engaged with
building a launcher with nothing specific in view for it to launch.”7 As
the UK’s ongoing departure from the EU remains a pressing issue, the
organization’s past trials reconciling with the island state offer a rare
precedent for the uncharted waters of Brexit. The later foundation of
the ESA cleaned up much of the mess left by ELDO, and the then-new
organization promised to reconcile the legal status of Europe’s space
ed. Lesley Jane Smith and Inigo Baumann (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing,
2011), 29.
5 Suzuki, Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration, 8.
6 R.Lüst, “TheEuropeanSpaceResearchOrganization,”Science 149, no. 3682 (1965):
394–397.
7 John, Walsh, “ESRO: Space Sciences Research in Europe Suffers Growing Pains,”
Science 158, no. 3798 (1967): 244.
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cooperation and to detail the obligations of each ESA member state.
Rüdiger Freiherr von Preuschen’s 1978 article, “The European Space
Agency,” provides a key analysis of the ESA’s starting legal framework
and reinforces the importance of reaching a “… common European
position,” a key facet echoed by recent, specialized works in the field.8
Adapting the past problems and resolutions in the ESA’s history
to its modern issues regarding the UK’s decision to leave the European
Union requires a thorough understanding of the so-called Brexit’s ori-
gins in British politics. As the ESA developed through its predecessor
organizations, the UK’s skeptical approach to European integration
parallels the issues and attitudes overcome by the ESA. Though the UK
has since succumbed to its Eurosceptic urges in an unprecedented split
from the EU, the attitudes which drove the British to leave the bloc are
not without past evidence. As Britain’s political parties gradually made
Euroscepticism a partisan issue, the resulting rift in public and electoral
opinion offered plenty of hints towards the present Brexit crisis. The
ESA’s current relationship with the island state is built upon decades
of successful cooperation and accommodation of the UK’s wavering
commitment towards Europe and will be dependent on this tested rela-
tionship in the coming years. As the ESA’s future with the UK is depen-
dent on the direction intended by the now-Eurosceptic Conservatives,
the perspective set by the literature of British Euroscepticism is invalu-
able to determining what precedent may be applied to Theresa May’s
promises for a hard Brexit.
Support for Eurosceptic policies and actions among Britons mani-
fested unexpectedly in the United Kingdom’s party system. A cursory
overview of the parties’ respective platforms may lead one to expect
a simple, clean-cut divide between anti and pro-Europe parties. How-
ever, the reality inside Parliament is far more nuanced than the seem-
ingly binary issue may suggest. Beginning in the 1970s, as European
integration mustered additional support, analysis of Eurosceptic fac-
tions in the United Kingdom illustrated integration as an issue which
uniquely associated with party ideologies yet still split opinion like a
nonpartisan issue. Contemporary events, headlined by the intensely
Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party’s rise to power as an
influential third party, and preexisting research suggested that British
parties could expect electoral support from a consistently Euroscep-
8 Rüdiger Freiherr von Preuschen, “The European Space Agency,”The International
and Comparative LawQuarterly 27, no. 1 (1978): 54.
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tic platform. Despite UKIP’s ascent into mainstream politics, little re-
search is available to process how the rising party’s success correlated
with and possibly affected Britain’s surprise 2016 vote to leave the Eu-
ropean Union.
Past analysis has examined howEuroscepticism has simultaneously
destabilized the Conservative Party while bringing relative stability to
Labour. When emphasizing Conservative disorganization during the
European Union’s early days in the 1990s and early 2000s, research
hypothesized a future breakaway from traditional Conservative pol-
itics over the Euro issue. Contemporary research builds upon these
threads in their analysis of the new United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP), a party which overtly makes British nationalism over
integration a key platform plank. As the United Kingdom pursues its
exit from the European Union, the steady emergence of European rela-
tions as a partisan issue will necessarily build upon these established
hypotheses while examining from where British parties and politicians
can derive support in a post-Brexit era.
Questions surrounding the United Kingdom’s place in an increas-
ingly integrated postwar Europe are as old as the efforts to bring the
continent together. Associating Euroscepticism with party divides is
demonstrably a more recent endeavor, however.9 In his 2003 paper
“The Shotgun Marriage: Managing Eurosceptical Opinion in British
Political Parties 1972-2002,” David Baker of the University of Warwick
illustrates the increasing divide created in British political parties as a
product of increasing European integration. The piece hypothesizes
and demonstrates that the enduring Eurosceptic dissent within the
Conservative (Tory) and Labour parties often cuts across party lines on
matters of Britain’s place in an integrated Europe. Baker approaches
the question of party platform management from both the Conserva-
tive and Labour perspectives, demonstrating the two parties’ meth-
ods of managing dissent in their respective parties. Within this dis-
cussion, Baker contrasts the Conservative’s devolution into factions
with Labour’s new reforms and unity. The piece utilizes votes from the
1971-72 and 1992-92 parliamentary sessions on the respective European
Communities Bill and the Maastricht Treaty10 as a focal point for its
9 David Baker, “The ShotgunMarriage:Managing EuroscepticalOpinion in British
Political Parties 1972–2002,” (paper presented at the EUSA Eighth Biennial Inter-
national Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, March 27–29, 2003).
10 Baker, “The Shotgun Marriage.”
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analysis. The votes are then sorted by their association with their re-
spective party platforms. Baker compares the number of dissenting
members of Parliament (MPs) between the two votes. From this analy-
sis, Baker derives support for his argument, showing that the Conser-
vatives have been increasingly split between pro and anti-Euro MPs
while the number of dissenting, anti-Euro MPs increased between the
two votes. Using this data, Baker posits that future Conservative Party
divides will occur along the same, intensifying lines as the earlier votes.
Split opinions within parties both affect and are affected by elec-
toral support. As Baker demonstrates, Conservative MPs increasingly
voted in favor of Eurosceptic policies in the 1992 vote on the Maastricht
Treaty. Geoffrey Evans, in his article “Euroscepticism and Conservative
Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a Liability,” compares the in-
creasingly Eurosceptic appearance of the Conservative Party to public
opinion on both an aggregate and individual level.11 Evans addresses
the increasing levels of Euroscepticism in the Conservative party and
asks how this change affects the party’s electoral support. The piece hy-
pothesizes that, despite approaching the average sentiments of Britons,
the Conservative Party is ultimately losing electoral support on an indi-
vidual level. The argument revolves around data taken from the British
Election Panel Study (BEPS). The study randomly selected British vot-
ers to respond to their attitudes on issues related to European integra-
tion as well as their interpretation of major political parties’ prefer-
ences on the same topics. Evans then compares this data to the parties’
own self assessments to analyze whether Eurosceptic policies are an as-
set or a liability when gathering electoral support. Data begins in 1992,
the year of the Maastricht vote, and proceeds through 1996.12
Using the BEPS data, Evans clearly demonstrates a divide between
Conservative party self-identification and voter identification. Be-
tween 1992 and 1996, the Conservative Party was simultaneously
perceived as increasingly pro-integration by Eurosceptics and in-
creasingly anti-integration by pro-integration voters. The same data
demonstrates no such disparity for liberal parties including Labour
and the Liberal Democrat parties, lending evidence to the research
hypothesis. Furthermore, Evans finds that integration has a statisti-
cally significant effect on voting intention even when other issues are
11 Evans, Geoffrey. “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an
Asset Became a Liability.” British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (1998): 573.
12 Evans, “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support,” 3–4.
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introduced,13 demonstrating a lose-lose situation for Conservatives
given voter perceptions. Evans concludes the piece with a suggestion
that integration issues, given Britain’s drift towards the continent at
the time of its writing, suggests that a consistently clear Eurosceptic
line could offer electoral support to a party platform.
Recent examinations of the British public’s opinions on Euroscep-
ticism continue and reinforce the conclusions Evans derived from the
BEPS survey. By 2012, 20 years after the start of the BEPS survey, Eu-
roscepticism had grown beyond anti-Euro policies towards favoring a
referendum on Britain’s space in the European Union. Thomas Raines’s
short examination “An island apart?” asks whether the United King-
dom has a place in the European Union at all. The work, citing a prece-
dent of past Euroscepticism as examined in Evans and Baker, hypothe-
sizes that a referendum is likely based on available demographic data.14
Raines presents data taken from the 2012 Chatham House YouGov Sur-
vey representing the most recent data at the time of the article’s print-
ing. The data is presented in a graphical format, which is unfortunately
not shared in the article. However, the full raw data is easily accessible
from the Chatham House organization.15 What Raines presents closely
fits the narrative presented by earlier authors. Preexisting political ge-
ography does not correlate with Eurosceptic sentiments; Raines notes
that traditionally non-Conservative Wales strongly supports leaving
the European Union despite their political inclinations.16 Furthermore,
the Chatham House data shows that most Britons favored holding a
referendum, reinforcing Raines’s claim that Eurosceptic sentiments
were approaching a climax.17
The results of the 2015 British General Election were widely ex-
pected to shock the British system and illustrate sharp divides between
Eurosceptic and pro-Europe parties. Joachim Fritz-Vannahame illus-
trates in “Turbulent Times in the Disunited Kingdom” the sentiments
which may drive voters to an unprecedentedly divided Parliament.18
13 Ibid., 587.
14 Raines, Thomas. “An Island Apart?”TheWorld Today 68, no. 5 (2012): 26–27.
15 Chatham House, “YouGov Survey 2012: British Attitudes Towards the UK’s Inter-
national Priorities,” July 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/
184631.
16 Raines, “An island apart?,” 27.
17 Ibid.
18 Joachim Fritz-Vannahame, “Turbulent Times in a Disunited Kingdom,” spotlight
europe #2015/01 (April 2015).
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Vannahame’s title references a “disunited kingdom,” an apt descrip-
tion for his research question asking how nationalist and anti-Europe
party platforms will affect the traditional Labour-Conservative divide.
He hypothesizes that the de facto binary party system of the past will
give way to a plurality of parties defined by fragmented geopolitical
ideologies. In his analysis, Vannahame utilizes two sources of data: the
United Kingdom Electoral Commission for past election results and
forecasts for the 2015 election, and Chatham House survey data from a
2014 YouGov survey for voter beliefs. The author makes special note
of a new, highly Eurosceptic party unseen in the earlier research of
Baker, Raines, and Evans. UKIP addresses the issues spelled out in ear-
lier research into Euroscepticism and the Conservatives by promoting
a platform centered around leaving the EU, with 90% of their members
unambiguously favoring Britain’s exit from the Union.19 In addition
to resolving earlier researchers’ claims that a consistently Eurosceptic
platform may net electoral success, Vannahame further reinforces the
notion that voters are increasingly less likely to maintain strict left or
right wing politics as offered by mainstream politics. Evidencing his
hypothesis is data matching the trends in Evans’s 1998 work, except
alternate, nationalistic parties, as exemplified by UKIP, have left the
two major parties clinging uneasily to uncontested power.
Continuing the threads left by both Vannahame and Baker is Em-
manuel Mourlon- Durol’s article “The UK’s EU Vote: The 1975 Prece-
dent and Today’s Negotiations.”20 Written only two months after Van-
nahame’s analysis, the piece analyzes the added wrinkle of an impend-
ing referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union, a vote
made possible by unprecedented gains for Eurosceptic MPs in the 2015
election. Mourlon-Durol’s research question asks whether the UK’s
1975 referendum on the state’s inclusion in the European Economic
Community (EEC) is a valid comparison to Britain’s current situation
facing a British exit from the European Union (Brexit). The author hy-
pothesizes that, as was seen following British skepticism 40 years prior,
the pending referendum will, regardless of result, negatively impact
Britain’s position in Europe. Data from the 1975 referendum sourced
from the UK national archives and key platform planks from the then
ruling Labour Party are compared to the party platform of the ruling
19 Fritz-Vannahame, “Turbulent Times,” 3.
20 Emmanuel Mourlon-Durol, “The UK’s EU Vote: The 1975 Precedent and Today’s
Negotiations,” Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/08 (June 2015).
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Conservatives and new, post-2015 minority parties. Mourlon-Durol
successfully illustrates similarities between the European political cli-
mate between the two eras, but when comparing the party platforms,
Mourlon-Durol finds a situation like the Conservatives’ plight in the
Evans article, where the Conservatives maintain a vaguely Eurosceptic
platform which does not overtly advocate Brexit. Such a soft message
does not align perfectly with the example of 1975, and Mourlon-Durol
emphasizes that the outcome cannot be forecast by the past referen-
dum. However, he does establish that the present referendum will likely
leave Britain in a fractured state, in regard to both its foreign and do-
mestic policies.21
While UKIP has only recently vaulted into the spotlight of political
authority, its roots dive deeper than the surprise of the 2015 election
may suggest. Roland Flamini, in the article “The UK Independence
Party: Eurosceptics Rattle Cameron,” dives in to UKIP’s Eurosceptic
origins in 1993.22 Like other recent research into British Euroscepti-
cism, Flamini’s research asks how UKIP has managed to earn repre-
sentation in traditionally Labour and Conservative strongholds. The
author hypothesizes that these gains are made in part by presenting a
consistently anti-Europe platform, the platform which, in 1998, Evans
hypothesized would net parties political gains. Though Flamini builds
upon this familiar thread, his analysis of UKIP’s rise as a product of Con-
servative disorganization adds an additional layer to the preexisting
field. The piece uses the voting results of a 2011 proposal to hold a refer-
endum on Britain’s EU membership as a focal point for his argument.
Though the vote was defeated, Flamini notes that 81 Conservative MPs
voted to hold the referendum in defiance of the government’s instruc-
tions.23 When placed in the larger body of work, this vote portents
UKIP’s gains four years later, and though Flamini wrote the article in
2013, he noted the existence of not only the internal pressure inside the
Conservative Party but also the new external pressure being applied
by UKIP. Using this vote as support for his hypothesis, Flamini builds a
distinct narrative for UKIP within the established research discussing
the Conservatives’ failing, partly-Eurosceptic message.
21 Mourlon-Durol, “The 1975 Precedent,” 9.
22 Roland Flamini, “The UK Independence Party: Euroskeptics Rattle Cameron,”
World Affairs 176, no. 2 (2013): 35.
23 Flamini, “The UK Independence Party,” 37.
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While significant analysis is given to the Conservatives’ mixed mes-
sages on European integration, Labour’s position at the table has been
less thoroughly examined. Evans’s 1998 analysis of Euroscepticism fo-
cused primarily on the disparity between Conservative policies and
public perception, but the study also takes note of Labour’s policies
and perceptions as well. Neither Evans nor future researchers place
focus on Labour’s message. Evans explains some of this away by con-
trasting Labour’s stronger, easily perceived pro-Europe policies with
the Tories’ mixed messages.24 Furthermore, the body of literature dis-
cussing British Euroscepticism consistently hypothesizes electoral suc-
cess for firmly Eurosceptic parties, a position which Labour demonstra-
bly does not follow. Some recent literature, notably Eunice Goes’s book
The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband, notes that Labour has lost some
ground to UKIP and Eurosceptics. As the party adopts an increasingly
international and pro-Europe tone, it risks alienating blue collar work-
ers who would be better served by the economic protections offered by
Eurosceptic parties.25
The body of literature examining British Euroscepticism is near-
universally connected by the nature of the issue outside the traditional
left-right power dynamic. From Baker’s criticisms of the Conservative
Party in the early 1970s to the party being caught unaware by UKIP’s
unprecedented entry to Parliament in 2015, the ability for a consis-
tently Eurosceptic message to create political support has been hypoth-
esized and well supported. In previous British general elections, both
Labour and the Conservatives published a Eurosceptic platform. In
1974, Labour rode Euroscepticism to victory, promising to renegoti-
ate the UK’s position in the EEC. Though Labour’s referendum did
not lead to significant changes in the UK-EEC relationship, it gave an
early precedent for Euroscepticism and electoral support. By the 1990s,
the Conservatives had an opportunity to mirror Labour’s earlier suc-
cess but failed to properly unify party perceptions and objectives into a
voting bloc. As recent literature suggests, particularly Mourlon-Durol
and Flamini’s respective works, the 2015 general election saw both the
example set by Labour in 1974 play out as well as a new dynamic intro-
duced by UKIP’s ascension. Further research can continue the narra-
24 Evans, “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support,” 580.
25 Eunice Goes, “Labour and the Politics of Belonging: One Nation.” In The Labour
Party under Ed Miliband: Trying but Failing to Renew Social Democracy, 146–172,
Manchester University Press, 2016.
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tive by examining how UKIP’s influence swayed a narrow majority of
British voters to accept Euroscepticism and Brexit.
The gap in modern research between the ESA and its partners pro-
vides the impetus for further research. Though Suzuki and Contracting
for Space tie Europe’s modern political context into its efforts in space
science, the field is sparsely researched in a modern context. While the
symptoms of Brexit have received considerable analysis over the last
half century, their effects on Europe’s space policy have received very
little examination. During the ESA’s formative years alongside the EU’s
predecessors, European space science was a true novelty. In its early
years, the Space Race was as bipolar as the Cold War which spawned it;
collective European entries into the field produced research and anal-
ysis into whether a collaborative entity could establish itself in such
a divisive political climate. Scientific sources were rife with specula-
tion with whether Europe could sort out the mess that was ELDO and
create something even minorly successful. Amidst the ground floor of
Euroscepticism, Europe’s push into space earned considerable analysis
from both scientific and political sources.
In a modern context, the ESA faces a comparable situation; major
Eurosceptic voices, once again led by the UK, threaten Europe’s now
proven experiment in scientific cooperation. Research and analysis,
however, has not caught up with the pace of events. Brexit, despite a
massive body of literature suggesting that the 2016 referendum’s results
were more predictable than David Cameron may have thought upon
promising the referendum to secure his government. In the present day,
the ESA faces a unique opportunity to establish itself as an exemplar
of European integration. Sitting between the EU and the rest of Eu-
rope, understanding the context of the Agency’s success in a freshly Eu-
rosceptic Europe is an unaddressed yet important subject in the midst
of an uncertain decade. Learning from the example set by the ESA and
understanding where the Agency intends to take itself offers a critically
important way for Europeans to rebuild the identity of the continent.
The cooperative dream of European integration has an opportunity to
survive, but it will only do so through an understanding of its past trials
and solutions, especially those in fields not often explored.
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The European Space Agency: Europe’s Cooperative
Space for the Final Frontier
Present day Europe, when given a cursory inspection, appears as a con-
tinent rife with unsatisfactory experiments in international cooper-
ation. A fresh wave of Eurosceptic voters and politicians dominate
headlines by railing against the evils of integration, countering decades
of steadily increasing cooperation. Lost in the scrum is the European
Union’s cooperative efforts with the longstanding ESA. Britain’s exit
from the Union, along with Eurosceptic movements across the conti-
nent, dominate news headlines while the ESA’s decades long record of
European cooperation risks becoming collateral damage. As the Eu-
ropean Space Agency navigates a present fraught with uncertainty,
the Agency’s history, development, and adaptations illuminate the
Agency’s route through tumultuous times in Europe. Having already
experienced and survived upheaval, reimagination, and even British
Euroscepticism, the ESA’s best model for a collaborative future may
already be in place.
In the late 1940s, Europe found itself in an unenviable position. The
Second World War saw much of the continent left in disarray, with
both states and their citizens needing to rebuild from the streets up.
Having dedicated all their respective resources to the war effort, prewar
powers like Britain and France gradually came to terms with securing
and bettering the home state over projecting power abroad, while Ger-
many found itself sundered into occupation zones and subject to the
will of foreign governments. Further compounding Europe’s ills was
the Soviet Union and the United States asserting dominance in world
affairs. No single state possessed even a shadow of its prewar influence;
caught between two nascent superpowers, no government could afford
to step out on its own.
The following decade would treat Western Europe far kindlier than
its predecessor. In response to the United States and the USSR domi-
nating world affairs, the first seeds of European integration began ger-
minating. Organizations like the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSE) and its successor, the European Economic Community, worked
to carve a niche for Europe between the two superpowers. By 1964,
integration projects even brought Europe into the burgeoning space
research field with twin agencies intended to crack the superpowers’
near monopoly on space science. Between the European Launcher De-
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velopment Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research
Organization (ESRO), Western European states developed a novel ap-
proach to space science. Though the organizations were grounded in
the political realities of the Cold War, the member states’ framework
created a space for a greatly expanded, cooperative future.
Serious talks for defining Europe’s future in space began in 1961.
Discussions held at the French-led “Commission préparatoire eu-
ropéenne de recherches spatiales” (COPERS) established a definitive
plan outlining what would become ESRO, including possible research
stations and an 8-year financial plan.26 By the time of the conference,
the Space Race had already started in earnest, and Europe remained
left out on both scientific and explorative fronts. Though COPERS
only laid out plans to establish ESRO, the effort’s scope expanded to
address all aspects just a year later to include proprietary launcher
development through ELDO. Though the two organizations were
functionally separate, they shared primary membership, headlined by
West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, both
shared similar 8-year timeframes and financial commitments.27
ESRO quickly established itself as a successful player in space re-
search, thanks in part to its well-defined goals. Rather than attempting
to pursue the superpowers to the Moon and back, ESRO eschewed
putting Europeans in space and instead worked to independently de-
sign experiments and satellites. As ELDO could not independently
develop a launch vehicle at the same pace as ESRO’s experiment de-
signs, early efforts were limited to preexisting launch technology. Using
French and British ballistic missiles, early experiments demonstrated
the necessity for ELDO to complete its objectives. Initial experiments
could not exceed an 80-kilogram load, the maximum allowed by the
British Skylark rocket. Independently launching satellite missions was
not possible, and ESRO had to primarily rely on American launch tech-
nology and facilities. For the launch of ESRO I and II, the organiza-
tion’s first two satellite endeavors, the organization used the Ameri-
can Scout rocket system and launched from North America.28 With
these resources, the organization successfully launched its first satellite,
26 “History of Europe in Space,” European Space Agency, last modified September 13,
2013, accessed April 4, 2017, http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_history/
History_of_Europe_in_space.
27 Ibid.
28 Lüst, “The European Space Research Organization,” 394–397.
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ESRO-2B, in 1968,29 just four years after the organization’s formation.
Later that year, the companion satellite ESRO-1 launched,30 demon-
strating Europe’s establishment as a player in space science.
Though the organization had to leave the European umbrella to
complete its initial mission, the satellites heralded ESRO’s arrival. A
cooperative approach, distinct from the adversarial relationship per-
petrated between the United States and the Soviet Union, helped to
establish a European identity in the field. Furthermore, the launches
demonstrated the organization’s ability to overcome internal disputes.
The 8-year plan laid out by the COPERS conference, agreed upon dur-
ing the organization’s creation, was not a rigid framework; rather, it
established flexible budget guidelines intended to increase as agreed
upon by member states. However, just one year before ESRO-1 and 2
successfully entered orbit, budget overruns and bureaucratic confu-
sion threatened to break the young organization apart. Great Britain,
in response to unevenly awarded contract work, threatened to abandon
ESRO entirely and pursue its own domestic space program.31 Europe’s
cooperative vision for space was already at risk of collapsing; Britain’s
exit would have meant losing a quarter of the organization’s budget
and severely hamstringing smaller members’ ambitions. Seeing that
ESRO’s model was vulnerable to quarreling, the 1967 European Space
Conference explicitly called for a more unified European space policy,
one which would allow all member states to coordinate beyond the
isolated development fostered by the ESRO and ELDO system.
Furthering calls to unify space policy was the ELDO’s inability to
get its objectives off the ground. While its research companion met
expectations with its satellite launches and pressed through various
national quibbles, the launcher organization yielded to disorganiza-
tion and disagreements. The organizations’ missions were intended to
unite for the Large Astronomical Satellite (LAS) launch in 1970. The
LAS was to exceed the size limits prescribed by repurposed national
rocket technology while freeing Europe’s ambitions from American
launchers and launch sites. Intended for a launch range granted by as-
29 “ESRO 2B,” NASA’s HEASARC: Observatories, last modified June 26, 2003, ac-
cessed April 8, 2017, https://heasarc.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/heasarc/missions/esro2b.html.
30 “History: ESRO-1 Satellite, 1968,” European Space Agency, accessed April 8, 2017,
http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_history/History_ESRO-1_satellite_1968.
31 Walsh, “ESRO,” 242–244.
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sociate member Australia,32 the LAS project was intended to leverage
separate national rocketry programs into a unified project. Rather than
operating under a strong central authority, individual states indepen-
dently created portions of the launch rocket to amalgamate into the
final product no later than 1970. By this time, ESRO expected to use
European rockets to launch three to four spacecraft per year.33 Such a
goal was visibly unrealistic by 1967, however. Cost overruns on ESRO’s
portion of the LAS satellite cast an unappealing shadow on the research
component, placing the objective of the endeavor in peril.34
Meanwhile, working for an increasingly doubtful experiment,
ELDO’s development model created undue inconsistencies and delays.
Member states were to develop portions of the rocket independently;
Britain would derive the first stage from its Blue Streak strategic mis-
sile, France was to develop the second stage, and West Germany was
to develop the third stage.35 The French second stage was already
derailing the project timeline by 1965. Its fuel system did not provide
the thrust necessary for a large experiment, and developing a higher
thrust, alternately fueled rocket would not collaborate well with West
German development on the third stage. Further complicating the
situation was massive cost overruns exceeding $100 million. Despite
the organization’s flexible budget, major members, particularly Great
Britain, once again balked at the cost. Britain even explored developing
proprietary launcher technology derived from American designs for
their domestic research.36 While ESRO overcame similar odds, includ-
ing a skittish Britain and decentralized administration, ELDO never
achieved its stated goals. However, its dysfunction unintentionally
had a positive consequence; scientific voices, from within the twin
organizations and from the space science community at large, came
together in favor of a centralized European effort in space. Britain,
instead of leaving both groups, led calls for a centralized agency to
combat what the British Interplanetary Society described as a “con-
fused, unplanned, and ineffectual” effort in the field and even offered
32 Lüst, “The European Space Research Organization,” 395–396.
33 Ibid., 396.
34 Walsh, “ESRO,” 244.
35 Victor K. McElheny, “European Launcher Development Organization: Its Chang-
ing Role.” Science 148, no. 3678 (1965): 1705–1706.
36 McElheny, “Changing Role,” 1706.
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to pay up to one fourth of the new agency’s budget.37 In place of unity
within and between ELDO and ESRO, European science set its sights
on taking what positive momentum the organizations generated and
unifying Europe’s vision for space under one roof.
In 1972, these advocates for a truly unified European space organi-
zation succeeded in their push to abandon the ELDO and ESRO model.
Using ESRO’s assets and projects as a nucleus, the European Space
council decided to formally fold the two agencies together.38 Officially
formed in 1975, the now unified European Space Agency was to con-
tinue ESRO’s preexisting scientific mission while pursuing new devel-
opments in independent heavy launchers. Furthermore, the cooper-
ative mission of the ESA made adding new members, full or partial,
simpler than the old binary model. Ireland officially joined in 1975,
joining the core of West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
By 1980, Austria would join the continental members, and Canada fol-
lowed as a cooperating member.39
Adapting from ELDO and ESRO’s structural problems was the
ESA’s top priority. While ESRO eventually found a comfortable middle
ground, ELDO never amounted to much more than a financial drain.
In response to the fractured efforts from the original organization, the
ESA required member states to undergo “Europeanisation” of their na-
tional space programs.40 First and foremost, Europeanisation would
place commonly shared assets and facilities under ESA administration.
Rather than seeing each project supervised primarily by the local gov-
ernment, the ESA would instead be the primary administrator. Coop-
eration would go through a centralized body, thereby addressing the
central issues of the old model. Administrative reforms made the new
cooperative model possible, and unlike its predecessors, the ESA was
created with intent to coordinate the agency’s endeavors and enforce fi-
nancial commitments. Gone were the dysfunctions of the original LAS
project; instead of relying on a haphazard combination of a former
British strategic missile, an underpowered French booster, and a pos-
sibly unnecessary German third stage, any future ESA launch vehicle
37 “Aerospace Notes,” Science News 93, no. 5 (1968): 116.
38 Rüdiger Freiherr von Preuschen, “The European Space Agency,”The International
and Comparative LawQuarterly 27, no. 1 (1978): 46–60.
39 ESA, “History.”
40 Von Preuschen, “The European Space Agency,” 49.
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would have a uniformly European composition. Furthermore, any new
national projects in space science started by ESA members would nec-
essarily be open to agency member participation. New projects, rather
than staying purely national, would instead operate under the greater
ESA umbrella. Member states who have similar objectives or needed
expertise could join in on the project. In addition to fostering a truly
cooperative European space science community, this effort prevented
project duplication while ensuring a coherent mission.41
The ESA inherited the ESRO’s scientific plan and the ELDO’s mis-
sion objectives. The union of the two notably produced the Ariane
launcher development program. By the mid-1980s, the Ariane program
would not only give Europe the domestic heavy launcher it had chased
since the 1960s, but it would establish the ESA as an international, inde-
pendent, and innovative player in space science. First described at the
1973 conference which affirmed the ESA’s creation, Ariane developed a
series of highly successful rockets close to both the acceptable budget
and timeframe. The first launch in 1979 was a resounding success, and
by 1981, the ESA at last launched its own satellites, the Marecs 1 and
Meteosat, from a launch site in French Guiana.42 Ariane developments
continued to perform favorably throughout the 1980s, unquestionably
establishing the ESA as a distinct third power in space. Beyond the orig-
inal Ariane program, ESA member states even created a new frontier
in launcher development: commercial launch vehicles. Building on Ar-
iane’s early success, France led ESA member states in the creation of a
private company, Arianespace, to develop and market Ariane rockets
for an international market. By 2000, Arianespace had established it-
self as a world leader in commercial launch technology with the Ariane
5 heavy launch rocket.43
The ESA was not alone in pursuing Europeanisation. Mechanisms
of European cooperation similarly unified throughout the end of the
20th century. Efforts like the European Coal and Steel Community ex-
panded into the European Economic Community in 1958, and despite
some states’ balking, notably the United Kingdom mirroring its threats
41 Von Preuschen, “The European Space Agency,” 50.
42 M. Bignier, J. Vandenkerckhove, and G. M. Webb. “The Ariane Programme [and
Discussion].” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A,




to go it alone in space science,44 the EEC brought some unity to the
continent’s economic policies. Expansion continued throughout the
1990s, eventually culminating in the European Union. The ESA, both
in core and newly added members, shared major members with the
nascent EU, including France, West Germany, and the United King-
dom. Though the ESA is, by its self-defined structure, an independently
functioning organization, cooperation with the EU as supranational
organizations had too many mutual benefits to not embrace. Their rela-
tionship was formally codified at the joint 4th European Space Council.
While this 2007 meeting was not the first official collaboration between
the two, the meeting’s result formally codified the ESA and EU’s part-
nership. The resulting European Space Policy demonstrates the EU’s
support while encouraging the ESA to continue cooperative work with
the Union. Especially relevant to this call is the EU’s use of ESA satel-
lites for defense purposes; the ESA’s satellites are civilian by design and
intent, and ensuring the Union’s third party use of these instruments
requires the ESA’s full cooperation, including that of members not held
in common between the Agency and the Union.45
The two entities’ joint future is thoroughly discussed in the Space
Policy. As the ESC concluded, further cooperation could provide great
mutual benefits; the EU would have greater means to maintain its own
security, while the ESA could benefit from the Union’s political clout.
Both the ESA and EU are major players in their respective areas, and
further partnership would bring the European continent another step
closer to true superpower level influence. However, rapid integration
of the ESA into the EU would likely serve neither party. Over thirty
years of proven success from the ESA evidences the strength of the
preexisting model. The Space Policy emphasizes its commitment to
the Agency’s independence, noting explicity “… that the independence
and reliability of ESA… contributes to the increasing role of Europe.”46
44 Mourlon-Durol, “The 1975 Precedent.”
45 Council of the European Union, “4th Space Council Resolution on the European
Space Policy,” Brussels, May 22, 2007, 5.
46 Council of the European Union, “Space Policy 2007,” 6.
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Bridging the Channel: British Euroscepticism in the
Age of Integration
As Europe has progressed towards integration, cooperation, and a uni-
fied purpose, it faced no small variety of challenges. Like the ESA’s
rocky path towards success, the road to the EU was not a smooth one,
especially for the United Kingdom. Chief among the sceptics is the
United Kingdom. While the British were threatening to collapse the
continent’s progress into space, their political dynamic threatened to
sink the early European Community as well. The UK has consistently
acted as an entity apart from continental Europe; its colonial adven-
tures set it leagues apart from its continental rivals and established a
mindset of British superiority that continues to inform British voters
and is exploited by their leaders. World War II, despite bringing about
the definitive end of the empire’s supremacy, further maintained the
distance between the Isles and the rest of the continent. Such distance,
both literal and political, kept the UK as the last major power actively
opposing Nazi Germany for some time. Furthermore, the UK solidified
its relationship with its prodigal child, the United States, during the
war. The “Special Relationship” between the two states gave the UK a
unique relationship with one of the world’s two superpowers.
As the continental states looked inward and increasingly pooled
their resources, the UK began an ongoing internal conflict as to whether
the state should circle the wagons with its regional peers or seek to re-
claim the outwards projections of the British Empire. As early as 1942,
before the end of the war was even on the horizon, the necessity of
abandoning the old model was understood by Parliament. Sir William
Beveridge’s “Social and Allied Services,” better known as “The Bev-
eridge Report,” called for an abandonment of the colonial adventure in
favor of an extensive social programs system. Projecting power would
necessarily take a backseat to remedying more local issues, with Sir
Beveridge stating, “A revolutionary moment in the world’s history is
a time for revolutions.”47 While the UK would indeed use Beveridge’s
ideas to inform its social policies, memories of the Empire and its influ-
ence would not pass so easily. Though social programs were intended
to replace the UK’s former priorities, Prime Minister Clement Attlee
47 Sir William Beveridge, “Social Insurance and Allied Services.” (Report presented




demonstrated the British split mindset with the infamous, disastrous
Suez Crisis of 1956. While the rest of the continent was progressing
towards the European Economic Community and the foundations of
ELDO and ESRO, the UK was acting out its last fantasies of power.
This state of mind, torn between a new path and the trappings of
old, typifies the contradictions of British politics that have continu-
ally manifested in the island state’s attitudes towards European collab-
oration and British nationalism. Over the last half-century, the Uni-
ted Kingdom’s partnership with Europe has been subject to immense
scrutiny and politicization. The current crisis of Brexit, though it may
be unprecedented for a state to depart from the EU, is the product of
an ongoing process of politicized Euroscepticism. Brexit and its subse-
quent effects on the UK’s position in European programs like the ESA is
best seen through the precedents set by decades of tug of war between
the Eurosceptic and pro-Europe agendas in Parliament.
Euroscepticism in British politics may seem like a binary issue
at first glance, especially in the modern context of Brexit. David
Cameron’s promise of a referendum on the UK’s EU membership
played a role in solidifying his Conservative Party’s power, while
Labour has become the de-facto party of the pro-Europe camp. How-
ever, the roots of Euroscepticism are not inherently partisan between
the two parties, despite the binary nature of the issue. Rather, its
origins lie in the conflict between traditionalists seeking a return to an
independently powerful Britain and those seeking to refocus the state’s
resources; Clement Attlee’s failed gambles came under his Labour
government, and the distrust in European cooperation, particularly
in the ESA’s predecessor organizations, was not yet a partisan issue.
ELDO’s failed launcher development program nearly drove the UK
away from European space collaboration altogether and towards its
legacy across the Atlantic in the United States.
The UK’s Interplanetary Society, fearing that their state “… had
been frittering away money on disjointed individual programs and
pouring cash into international programs which have not been paying
off,” nearly broke away from ELDO in 1965.48 Plagued by incompati-
ble parts between the jointly developed sections of the launcher, the
UK saw its domestically driven Blue Streak missile project stall under
ELDO’s model. While the launcher was unable to launch sufficient pay-
48 “Aerospace Notes,” Science News 93, no. 5 (1968): 116.
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loads into orbit, the Blue Streak project was compatible with a jointly
developed American project, the Black Knight rocket.49 Originally de-
veloped for use as an antimissile system, the resulting Black Arrow
rocket may have “… cost as little as 5% of the cost of an ELDO-A rocket
launch.” This cast serious doubt on the stability of ELDO in its existing
state,50 leading to the successful push for a unified space agency, the
ESA, in 1975.
ELDO’s ineffective and expensive development model gave the
UK good reason to doubt the efficacy of European scientific cooper-
ation. Money wasted in furthering the Blue Streak launcher stage left
the UK to wonder whether a European partnership could even supple-
ment its own programs. However, at this stage in UK’s greater relation-
ships with the rest of Europe, the Euroscepticism resulting from the
ELDO/ESRO model were only a portion of the UK’s greater issues with
Europe and the EEC. The UK’s dissatisfaction with failed French invest-
ments in launcher technology in the mid-1960s were only multiplied by
the greater French opposition to admitting the UK to the EEC. Charles
de Gaulle, in his strong-willed, nationalistic policies, repeatedly ve-
toed the UK’s possible membership to the Community. Through both
a conventional vote and the infamous “empty chair” policy, de Gaulle’s
political will prevented any possibility of British membership from
1963-1967. De Gaulle’s “… geopolitical ‘grand design,’ which aimed to
promote French sovereignty and grandeur,” left little love for a poten-
tial rival across the English Channel.51 Though the exploration of the
Black Arrow launcher partnership with the US is only a small symptom
of early British Euroscepticism, it informs the attitudes held by both
voters and Members of Parliament in the coming decades of integra-
tion.
While the UK overcame its skepticism in space science and resisted
the pull of the Special Relationship with the US, its politics remained
awash with Euroscepticism. Roiled by conflict as to whether the UK
should at last join the EEC now that the French no longer blocked the
way, British politics acquired its partisan Eurosceptic flavor. Beginning
in the 1970s, as European integration became an increasingly pressing
issue, Eurosceptic factions became increasingly valued as a source of
49 McElheny, “Changing Role,” 1706.
50 Ibid.
51 Andrew Moravcsik, “Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The New Revisionism,” Jour-
nal of ColdWar Studies 14, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 54.
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electoral support. Dissent within the Conservatives and Labour was
met with differing responses; the Conservatives, once the pro-Europe
party of the UK, anticipated greater support from Eurosceptics in
the future and gave in to its anti-integration members by the time of
Cameron’s 2016 referendum. At the time of the UK’s 1972 admission
to the EEC, the Conservatives shepherded the way into the bloc, while
Labour served as the party of contrary resistance. Labour’s Eurosceptic
1974 general election manifesto, headlined by a strong push to renego-
tiate the UK’s two-year-old membership with the EEC, even pushed
the party back in to power the same year.52
Labour PM Harold Wilson wasted no time in following up on his
party’s manifesto with grandiose, sweeping demands for the EEC. Wil-
son sought special protections for the UK in exceedingly vague terms
which emphasized British economic sovereignty from the economic
bloc’s rules.53 Unsurprisingly, the demands resulted in little real action.
However, Labour also ran on the promise of a popular referendum for
EEC membership which Wilson followed through on in June 1975. Like
the sweeping demands that his government made to the EEC, the refer-
endum changed little; the results saw the stay vote win with 67.23% of
the vote. Even Wilson’s government was in favor of staying, despite the
ineffectiveness of their attempted negotiations, as “Wilson exception-
ally allowed government ministers to differ from the government rec-
ommendation and vote following their consciences,” which resulted
in a 16-7 vote in favor of remaining.54
Despite the demonstrated failure of Labour’s objectives and a vic-
tory for Britons in favor of integration, the 1972-1975 period demon-
strated the potential for political gains from a Eurosceptic agenda. Even
though the 1975 referendum resulted in an overwhelming defeat for Eu-
rosceptics, Labour’s victory in Parliament on the platform illustrated
the possible long-term electoral power of a Eurosceptic agenda. Fol-
lowing the Thatcher years in the 1980s, where Conservative politics ap-
pealed to the older sentiments of an independently strong Britain and
austerity, the party attempted to pivot towards a Eurosceptic agenda
and mimic Labour’s past success. By the 1990s, the party put forth
an increasingly anti-integration front. Following the 1992, 1994, and
1996 elections, the British Election Panel Study recorded voter percep-





tions and inter-party perceptions of Labour, Conservative, and Liberal
Democrat attitudes towards integration. Geoffrey Evans’ 1998 analysis
of the data, “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How
an Asset Became a Liability,” noted a severe disparity between how the
Conservatives viewed their Euroscepticism versus how voters saw the
party.55 The resulting disparity strongly affected the Conservatives’
inner dynamics in the 1997 and 2001 elections and resulted in “vicious
Conservative infighting.” For the first time in recent history, it switched
attention on inter-party dissent from Labour to the Conservatives.56
The Conservatives’ internal dissent came full circle by 2015. David
Cameron, in an effort to reinvigorate his party’s appeal, promised a
referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU. His promise, like his
Labour predecessors 40 years prior, appealed to a wide range of voters.
In a contemporary Chatham House survey, 60% of voters favored a
referendum, and only 24% outright rejected the proposal.57 Labour’s
quixotic quest to renegotiate and reinvent the UK’s position in Europe
earned it electoral success for some time without the potential conse-
quences of a non-integrated UK as a real possibility. Cameron’s 2015
promise did indeed help his party stave off movement from the far
right. The United Kingdom Independence Party, sprung up from the
fertile ideology of an independent UK that was a tempting option even
in the UK’s early efforts in integration like ELDO and ESRO. Included
with his promise was an admission that “… changes are necessary and
acknowledging that public disappointment with the EU is at an ‘all
time high.”’58 With the referendum in hand, Cameron’s Conservatives
returned to power, leaving European leaders with strong sense of un-
certainty whether “… Cameron has a clear idea of what relationship
he envisions with the EU because so much of what he says on the issue
is intended to score points on the domestic political front.”59 Unlike
Wilson’s attempt to renegotiate the UK’s membership after only two
years of membership, Cameron put decades of continual integration
with the EU on the line; targeted development aid, trade agreements,
55 Geoffrey Evans, “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an
Asset Became a Liability,” British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (Oct. 1998):
577.
56 Baker, “The Shotgun Marriage,” 4.
57 Fritz-Vannahame, “Turbulent Times,” 2–3.




the UK’s future in European space science, and countless other projects
offered far higher stakes than its only precedent could offer.
While the European Union and the Conservative government
both anticipated a changed relationship following the referendum, the
actual results severely shocked both camps. The 1975 referendum offers
no precedent; a solid, 52% to 48% majority voted to leave the Union.60
Cameron’s gamble failed spectacularly. Like the 1975 referendum,
where a large faction of Labour backed remaining, Cameron spear-
headed the Remain campaign despite the considerable Eurosceptic
support that his party had gained over time and in the 2015 general
election. Following his faction’s defeat, Cameron faced no choice but
to step down, stating that “’… the country requires fresh leadership
to take it in this direction.”’61 Cameron’s replacement, former Home
Secretary and longtime Conservative MP Theresa May, came to Down-
ing St. to strike a conciliatory note between the Leave and Remain
factions in her party; however, her attitude on Brexit is far less flexible
and has stated unequivocally that “’Brexit means Brexit.”’62 May’s
hardline stance matches the rhetoric of the EU’s own framework for
leaving the Union, the 2008 Treaty of the European Union’s Article
50. Article 50 gives the departing state two years to negotiate its exit
from the time it invokes its exit.63 In triggering the article on March
29, 2017, May expressed a desire to fully depart from the Union “…
within the two-year period set out for withdrawal discussions in the
Treaty.”64 With the clock still ticking towards the UK’s departure, the
60 “EU referendum: full results and analysis,” The Guardian, accessed
January 12, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2016/jun/23/
eu-referendum-live-results-and-analysis?CMP=twt_b-gdndata.
61 Heather Stewart, Rowena Mason, and Rajeev Syal, “David Cameron re-
signs after UK votes to leave European Union,” The Guardian, June 24,
2016, accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/
david-cameron-resigns-after-uk-votes-to-leave-european-union.
62 Gavin Stamp, “Who is Theresa May: A profile of UK’s new prime minister,”
BBC News, July 25, 2016, accessed January 12, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-politics-36660372.
63 EuropeanUnion, “Consolidatedversionsof theTreatyonEuropeanUnionand the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”Official Journal of the European
Union 51 (May 9, 2008): 43.
64 Theresa May, Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50, March 29, 2017,





Union and its associated organizations like the ESA must retool and
reframe their existing objectives in preparation for a United Kingdom
separated from the continent by more than just the English Channel.
CloseOrbits andNew Satellites: The ESA and its Part-
ners in the Present Day
Despite the United Kingdom’s pattern of internal division and un-
evenly Eurosceptic politics, the ESA’s joint relationship with the
split-minded islanders and the greater European network strength-
ened alongside the EU’s rise throughout the 2000s. Before the renewed
winds of Euroscepticism began blowing across the continent, the
relationship between European space science and its political structure
only deepened. Acting on the terms of the 2008 TEU, the EU pressed
ahead with the already fruitful relationship with the still-independent
ESA in the coming years. Bolstered by the language of Article 189,
the treaty tasked the Union to “… establish any appropriate relations
with the European Space Agency,” which could “… take the form of a
European space programme.”65
While the ESA already discredited the idea of dispersed authority
in the ELDO and ESRO years, its status as an independent research
organization did not naturally predispose its continued movement to-
wards the Union and its predecessors; rather, the Union’s expansion
into the realms of space security and science worked its way into the
ESA’s sphere. Expanded cooperation between the two became nec-
essary for both parties, especially given the core status of EU mem-
ber states like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom within the
Agency. Predominantly civilian projects fit within the past political
framework, strategically focused objectives or the repurposing of ex-
isting programs require a reformed relationship. Of particular concern
to the push for further integration is the Global Monitoring for Envi-
ronment and Security (GMES) initiative. Formally adopted in a 2001
joint ESA-EU resolution, GMES is designed to assess the issues and
hazards associated with global climate change and implement a system
of strategic monitoring intended to aid in conflict resolution.66 Euro-
pean defense initiatives as part of a greater European space strategy had
65 European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union,” 131.
66 Suzuki, Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration, 199.
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“… not existed in the History of European space collaboration” until
the last 20 years of its history.67 The start of the millennium radically
shifted the ESA’s objectives towards a dual mission with strategic value
in addition to its well-established scientific origins.
The European Commission’s 2007 objectives for the ESA, already
established as a key definitional document for the ESA as Europe’s out-
let for space research and exploitation, also underscores the objectives
outlined by the TEU and serves as a foundational document for the
ESA’s recent movement towards the Union and its joint objectives over
national projects. The 2007 Communication firmly establishes the tone
of their future relationship as an imperative, stating “… Europe can-
not afford to lose out on securing the potential economic and strate-
gic benefits of space” and clearly describing a relationship going far
beyond scientific cooperation.68 Spurred by the European Commis-
sion’s expressed desire to pursue a new type of partnership, the 2007
document laid out the ESA’s path towards the Union through “a joint
international relations strategy in space” requiring not just further co-
operation with the Union, but also the coordination of national space
programs in the pursuance of a fully integrated European Space Pro-
gram.69 Included in these goals are GMES’ strategic initiatives and the
GALILEO navigation satellite program, which would see “the EU will
take the lead in the overall representation of applications programmes”
in current and future sensitive projects. On the other hand, the ESA
and its member states would retain primary control over its scientific
endeavors as it did in the past, including human spaceflight, launcher
development, and R&D.70
As clouds of Euroscepticism gathered just beyond the horizon, the
EU’s expansion into the ESA’s affairs further grew. By 2011, the Euro-
pean Parliament and European Council formally changed the legal sta-
tus of GMES into “… more than a research activity” to pursue the secu-
rity component of the program and cement GMES’ status as “dual-use
observation resources” that are “both civilian and military” in their im-
plementation.71 The EC’s 2011 communication frames the relationship
67 Ibid., 198.
68 Council of the European Union, “Space Policy 2007,” 1.
69 Ibid., 6.
70 Ibid., 12.
71 European Commission, “Communication from The Commission to The Coun-
cil, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee
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between the EU and the ESA in different terms than previous commu-
nications. The EU drove reframing of GMES as more than a standard
research activity, and while it acted with the consent of the ESA admin-
istration, the power in joint projects is biased towards the Union and
its Member States. The ESA, in the 7th meeting of its Space Council,
invited the European Commission, the EU Council, as-
sisted by the European Defence Agency (EDA), together
with Member States and the ESA “to explore ways to sup-
port current and future capability needs for crisis manage-
ment through cost-effective access to robust, secure and
reactive space assets and services […] taking full advan-
tage of dual-use synergies as appropriate.” It also invited
“theEuropeanCommissionand theEUCouncil topropose
policy solutions where necessary.”72
The ESA’s own rhetoric effectively invites the EU into the ESA’s
administration and explicitly allows the EU’s legislative and adminis-
trative bodies into the ESA’s policymaking process. EU-proposed poli-
cies, particularly the defense focused initiatives, are inherently limited
to the goals of EU Member States, not ESA members. Though consid-
erable overlap exists between the pair’s membership pools, the status
of members not held in common is questionable. External resources,
though they may be available to the ESA, are not on the table for EU-
ESA projects, as pursuing “… security missions without depending on
the facilities and services of non-Member States” is a cornerstone of
the Union’s efforts to uphold Article 189 of the TEU.73 Mere coexis-
tence and cooperation between the two, the status quo established in
the 1970s, is no longer the goal of European space science. While the
old model persists in the ESA’s research administration, integration of
the two institutions is the path forward.
By 2014, just one year before David Cameron would promise a ref-
erendum on the UK’s EU membership, the prospective relationships
described by the TEU the 2007 Communication, and the 2011 commu-
nication developed into a distinct, well-articulated set of objectives
for future cooperation. First outlined by the European Commission
and The Committee of The Regions: Towards A Space Strategy for The European
Union That Benefits Its Citizens,” (Brussels, April 4, 2011): 6.
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in 2012, the EC presented these four objectives as the most probable
and practical options for the two entities to further integrate. While
the ESA Director-General is reviewing these options on the same play-
ing field, the Commission’s status as the dictator of policy is a notable
change from even the 2011 communication. Of the viable options, only
maintaining the status quo retains the established legal framework be-
tween the two. A relationship formerly characterized the ESA under
the old paradigm as “… the pre- existing international organization
for European space cooperation” with “… its own mandate in the for-
mat of intergovernmental cooperation” is no longer a viable lens for
viewing EU-ESA relations.74
The first of the four options on the desks of both the European Com-
mission and the ESADirector-General makes no changes to the existing
framework. EU-driven programs, like Galileo and GMES, would coex-
ist between the two organization’s mandates and administrative struc-
tures. Negotiations for funding, policies, and missions would continue
to be laid out “phase-by-phase,” similarly to the process surrounding
GMES’ departure from the ESA’s norm of pure science.75 Option two
follows a similar path, though it would ideally reduce the negotiation
time for each phase of every project. Under “Improved cooperation
under the ‘status quo,”’ the ESA and EU would jointly develop a new
framework agreement, though the ESA would continue to function as
it has under the present relationship.76 The third option closely rep-
resents the ideas laid out in the 2011 communication. It grants the EU
considerable autonomy within its own “EU pillar” specifically designed
to operate within EU rules and procedures.77 While the pillar would pri-
marily operate autonomously from the rest of the ESA, it would remain
nominally part of the agency and “… would not affect the functioning
of the remaining departments of the intergovernmental ESA as it exists
today.”78 Finally, the fourth and most extreme option is the absorption
of the ESA into the EU. Under this structure, non-Union states would
be grandfathered in under the old framework to facilitate cooperation,
74 Schmit-Tedd, “The Relationship between the EU and ESA within the Framework
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75 European Commission, “Report from the Commission: Progress Report on Es-
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but EU programs and funding would dominate the Agency and its ob-
jectives.79 Of the four options, the council most specifically wished to
delve deeper into options two and three, stating “while option 3 may
be a better response to dealing with the structural issues in the EU/ESA
relations, option 2 (the revision of the existing Framework Agreement)
should be considered alongside with option 3.”80 Full integration, as
specified in the fourth option, would best favor the EU’s objectives,
but the Commission dismissed its immediate practicality in favor of
the tempered options. Though the Commission does not choose a dis-
tinct path, the document firmly established the inevitability of further
EU-ESA integration. Closer integration and cooperation would in turn
make fully absorbing the ESA far simpler.
Following the EU’s entrenchment of its firm position on deepening
cooperation with the ESA, the UK carried out the highly controver-
sial Brexit vote, leading to David Cameron’s ouster. PM Theresa May
cemented the UK’s departure from the bloc by triggering Article 50
of the Treaty of the European Union, and the Union dug in its heels
in response to May’s hardline rhetoric. At this line, the Union’s plans
for the ESA face serious doubt; keystone projects, including those al-
ready operating under the status quo, face at least a diminished role
from a founding member. Like the messy process of “… disentangling
legislation, regulations, procedures and other details,” the UK cannot
simply disengage from all EU-integrated projects in the ESA and expect
to remain a strong, leading member.81 However, unlike the hard-nosed
EU who is seeking to protect its members, interests, and integrity in
its negotiations with the UK, the ESA has nothing to gain from strik-
ing an aggressive, confrontational tone with the UK and its scientists.
Furthermore, the growing, evolving relationship between the ESA, its
member states, and its benefactors in the EU is not static, and it has
every incentive to foster a productive working relationship between
the three. Unlike Article 50 of the TEU, which offers no clear option for
walking back a stated intent to leave, the ESA’s structure is much more
accommodating.
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On June 18, 2016, just five days before the Brexit referendum, British
astronaut Tim Peake returned from a six-month stint on the Interna-
tional Space Station on a joint ESA-NASA mission. Having “‘… missed
a lot of the campaigning,”’ Peake struck a conciliatory tone after the sur-
prising Leave victory, hoping to “’… put that behind us now and work
on unity and moving forwards.”’82 Having viewed Brexit from an inter-
national, collaborative project orbiting far above the political concerns
of the continent, Peake’s perspective is fitting. ESA Director General
Jan Worner paralleled Peake’s attitude in the July after the referendum
and sought to emphasize Peake’s position as more than just a British cit-
izen. Following a visit to the UK to meet with Peake, PM Theresa May,
and ESA facilities throughout the UK, the Director General stakes out
a clear objective for the ESA amidst the Brexit chatter. Worner strikes
an ambitious tone throughout his description of his visit, citing how
the ESA has a “… remarkable decades-long track record and provides a
solid foundation fromwhich to tacklechallengesnowand in the future”
in reference to the Agency’s tumultuous yet successful past.83 Notably,
Peake pointedly mentions the new ESA facility near Oxford, indirectly
demonstrating his Agency’s already-established and growing place in
the UK. Worner ventures into territory typically occupied by the EU
in Europe’s political imagination, describing Peake as a scientist who
“… proves day in, day out that ESA does not just talk about Europe
but is the living and very dynamic embodiment of it.”84 Concern from
within the ESA about the possible effects of Brexit on their role in the
UK remained calm and measured after the vote. While the rest of the
UK sorted out the messy contradictions created by a Conservative gov-
ernment trying to not only to put up a strong face to the Union but also
trying to repair the internal bleeding caused by the ruling Conserva-
tive government’s split on the referendum, British citizens working
in the ESA remained calm. In a September 2016 interview with Engi-
neering and Technology, former UK Space Agency head David Parker
and current ESA Director of Human Spaceflight and Robotic Explo-
ration flatly stated that “The UK will continue to be a member of ESA
82 Ian Sample, “Tim Peake on Brexit: ‘I don’t want negative effects on UK science’,”
The Guardian, July 3, 2016, accessed March 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
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as long as it wishes to be.”85 No chaos and no messy split was needed;
the UK had not forsaken its allies in the space science community. At
the edge of current events, the ESA’s commitment to accommodating
the UK’s departure has not been as apparent as Worner and Parker’s
optimistic outlooks may have proscribed. The ESA is not showing the
UK the door, but rather their organization is simply not putting its es-
tablished plans and agreements with the Union on hold while Brexit
talks continue. The December 2016 ESA Ministerial Council meeting
set out to establish the Agency’s push towards “Space 4.0 for a United
Space in Europe.”86 Space 4.0 represents the Agency’s push towards
a new era in space science and application with a special focus on Eu-
ropean collaboration. The sentiments established by over a decade of
mutual negotiation will be fully realized in the Space 4.0 policy frame-
work; the Ministerial Council itself reaffirmed the ESA’s commitment
to the EU and specifically notes the need to establish “… sustainable
and mutually beneficial arrangements for cooperation that take into
account differences in the membership of ESA and of the European
Union.”87 While recent statements put the EU in the driver’s seat for
mutual negotiations, the Space 4.0 framework reestablishes the ESA’s
priorities in an uncertain Europe. With the policy, the Agency has un-
equivocally demonstrated its unique, self-determined place in Europe.
Though integration with the EU will continue, the ESA’s place as the
space agency for Europe remains a far more inclusive identity. Its ex-
ample serves as a functional reminder of what a unified Europe can
accomplish: a hard-fought, pioneering, independent voice between
greater individual powers. As Brexit negotiations continue, the fate
of European research has not gone unnoticed within the greater con-
text either. The European Council’s latest draft guidelines for Brexit
negotiations establish the UK’s position as “… subject to the relevant
85 Tereza Pultarova, “Brexit not a threat for UK space sector,” Engineering and Tech-
nology, September 14, 2016, accessed March 10, 2018, https://eandt.theiet.org/content/
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conditions for the participation of third countries” in the upcoming
Multiannual Financial Framework.88
Given its lengthy investment of time and money in a collabora-
tive mechanism for European space collaboration, doing so would not
only leave the UK out in the cold, but it would also forsake decades
of stable leadership in the ESA. In contrast to its role as the rambunc-
tious, unruly, and often unwilling stepchild of European integration,
the UK has been a leader in the ESA and its predecessors. Since its mea-
sured step towards Europe instead of the US in the ELDO/ESRO years,
the UK has guaranteed its position in space as a leader, not a follower.
Britain’s Eurosceptics have sustained their movement by appealing to
British sovereignty and glory; the 2016 Brexit vote saw that sentiment
at last boil over into the realm of consequence. While Prime Minister
Theresa May bargains for a portion of what Brexiteers expected from
their state’s allegedly restored sovereignty, the ESA’s unique position
allows for the United Kingdom to retain its orientation towards the
stars. Though the Agency’s deepening relationship with the Union will
dampen the depth of the island state’s participation, their continued
cooperation and coexistence will set an example for how other mecha-
nisms may function in the coming decade. As the ESA presses forward
into the era of Space 4.0, its future success rests upon its establishment
as a truly European space agency; not as an exclusive arm of the EU, but
as a continental effort including both a prudent, accommodating Union
and major external players like the United Kingdom. While May and
Tusk debate which programs the United Kingdom must leave, Europe’s
place in the cosmos will remain.
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